computer-use-agents
Build AI agents that interact with computers like humans do - viewing screens, moving cursors, clicking buttons, and typing text. Covers Anthropic's Computer Use, OpenAI's Operator/CUA, and open-source alternatives.
50
56%
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Critical
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tessl review fix ./skills/computer-use-agents/SKILL.mdSecurity
3 findings: 1 critical severity, 1 high severity, 1 medium severity. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.
E006: Malicious code pattern detected in skill scripts.
What this means
Detected high-risk code patterns in the skill content — including its prompts, tool definitions, and resources — such as data exfiltration, backdoors, remote code execution, credential theft, system compromise, supply chain attacks, and obfuscation techniques.
Why it was flagged
The content includes high-risk, dual-use capabilities (automatic full-screen screenshots sent to external LLM APIs, an LLM-invokable bash tool that runs arbitrary shell commands, and explicit evasion techniques to mimic human behavior/rotate fingerprints) that enable data exfiltration, remote code execution, and stealthy evasion — all of which can be readily abused as backdoors or for malicious automation.
W007: Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.
What this means
The skill handles credentials insecurely by requiring the agent to include secret values verbatim in its generated output. This exposes credentials in the agent’s context and conversation history, creating a risk of data exfiltration.
Why it was flagged
The skill instructs LLMs to emit structured "type" actions (e.g., {"type":"type","text":"..."}) and browser-fill actions that include plaintext "text" fields which can require the model to output secrets (passwords, API keys, tokens) verbatim, creating an exfiltration risk.
W013: Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions.
What this means
The skill prompts the agent to compromise the security or integrity of the user’s machine by modifying system-level services or configurations, such as obtaining elevated privileges, altering startup scripts, or changing system-wide settings.
Why it was flagged
The skill contains explicit system-modifying operations (Dockerfile RUN apt-get/useradd/setcap), code that launches docker containers on the host, and a bash/text-editor tool that runs arbitrary shell commands and writes files, which together enable creating users and changing system state.
Low
Low-risk findings.
1 low severity finding. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
What this means
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Why it was flagged
The skill’s runtime loop ingests outsider-controlled free text via the `task` argument (user-supplied) into the vision model prompt inside `ComputerUseAgent.run` as `{"type":"text","text": f"Task: {task}... }`, which can be crafted for prompt-injection.
- Repository
- sickn33/antigravity-awesome-skills
- Commit
1f67c44
- Audited
- Security analysis
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