Use when the user needs to provision a third-party service available on https://projects.dev/providers; create or retrieve a provider/service API, key or token; sign up for a service; or references projects.dev. Handles the full flow from checking provider availability through project initialization, then hands off to locally installed skills.
Security
4 findings — 4 medium severity. This skill can be installed but you should review these findings before use.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.80). The SKILL.md workflow explicitly instructs the agent to fetch and check https://projects.dev/providers (Step 1) and to read results from the public Stripe Projects catalog via `stripe projects search` / `stripe projects catalog --json` (Step 4 and related notes), meaning the agent must ingest open/public third‑party content that can affect whether and how it proceeds, so it is exposed to untrusted content that could enable indirect prompt injection.
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
Potentially malicious external URL detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill fetches https://projects.dev/providers at runtime to decide how to proceed (directly controlling agent flow), and also includes runtime installation commands that retrieve and execute remote packages/keys from https://packages.stripe.dev/... and a Scoop git URL (https://github.com/stripe/scoop-stripe-cli.git) to install the required Stripe CLI, so these URLs are runtime dependencies that control behavior or execute remote code.
The skill is specifically designed for direct financial operations, giving the agent the ability to move money or execute financial transactions — such as payment processing, cryptocurrency operations, banking integrations, or market order execution.
Direct money access detected (high risk: 1.00). The skill is explicitly built around Stripe Projects and the Stripe CLI to provision third‑party services, create/retrieve provider API keys/tokens, initialize Stripe Projects, and handle paid-service confirmations (uses Stripe-specific commands and flags such as --confirm-paid-service). This is a specific integration with a payment gateway (Stripe) rather than a generic tool, and it explicitly manages API keys/tokens for that gateway. Therefore it constitutes direct financial execution capability.
The skill prompts the agent to compromise the security or integrity of the user’s machine by modifying system-level services or configurations, such as obtaining elevated privileges, altering startup scripts, or changing system-wide settings.
Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions detected (high risk: 1.00). This skill explicitly instructs running privileged installation commands (uses sudo to write to /usr/share/keyrings and /etc/apt/sources.list.d, apt install, etc.), which modify system files and require elevated privileges, so it can compromise the machine state.