Browser automation CLI for AI agents. Use when the user needs to interact with websites, including navigating pages, filling forms, clicking buttons, taking screenshots, extracting data, testing web apps, or automating any browser task. Triggers include requests to "open a website", "fill out a form", "click a button", "take a screenshot", "scrape data from a page", "test this web app", "login to a site", "automate browser actions", or any task requiring programmatic web interaction.
92
92%
Does it follow best practices?
Impact
Pending
No eval scenarios have been run
Critical
Do not install without reviewing
Security
3 findings — 1 critical severity, 1 high severity, 1 medium severity. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.
Detected a suspicious URL in the skill instructions that could lead the agent to download and execute malicious scripts or binaries. This includes links to executables from untrusted sources, typosquatting of official packages, URL shorteners that obscure the destination, and personal file hosting services.
Suspicious download URL detected (high risk: 0.70). While many entries are benign placeholders or official pages (example.com, lightpanda.io docs, github.com/login), the list also contains an explicit malicious domain (malicious.com) and several ambiguous/unvetted hosts (site-a.com, site-b.com, prod/staging/app subdomains) and includes localhost/GitHub login entries — because the skill instructs downloading/executing from these URLs the presence of an explicitly malicious domain and untrusted hosts makes the set a suspicious potential malware-distribution vector.
The skill handles credentials insecurely by requiring the agent to include secret values verbatim in its generated output. This exposes credentials in the agent’s context and conversation history, creating a risk of data exfiltration.
Insecure credential handling detected (high risk: 0.80). The prompt includes examples that embed plaintext passwords and session tokens directly in CLI commands and state files (e.g., agent-browser fill "password123", state files with session tokens), which would require an LLM to include secrets verbatim in generated commands or code.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.90). This skill explicitly automates browsing arbitrary URLs and ingesting page content (e.g., SKILL.md core workflow and templates show agent-browser open <url>, agent-browser snapshot -i, and agent-browser get text body) so the agent will read untrusted third-party web content and use it to drive subsequent actions.
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