auto-review-loop-llm
Autonomous research review loop using any OpenAI-compatible LLM API. Configure via llm-chat MCP server or environment variables. Trigger with "auto review loop llm" or "llm review".
61
73%
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Critical
Do not install without reviewing
Fix and improve this skill with Tessl
tessl review fix ./skills/auto-review-loop-llm/SKILL.mdSecurity
1 critical severity finding. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.
E004: Prompt injection detected in skill instructions.
What this means
Detected a prompt injection in the skill instructions. The skill contains hidden or deceptive instructions that fall outside its stated purpose and attempt to override the agent’s safety guidelines or intended behavior.
Why it was flagged
The skill contains an explicit instruction to retry writes "silently" and "Do NOT ask the user for permission" (SKILL.md:209), which directs deceptive/unauthorized behavior outside the normal documented purpose of reviewing and documenting rounds.
Low
Low-risk findings.
2 low severity findings. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
What this means
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Why it was flagged
The required workflow calls an external reviewer via the `llm-chat` MCP tool / curl and then appends the “Reviewer Raw Response” (which is outsider-generated free text from the external LLM service) into `review-stage/AUTO_REVIEW.md`, which is then included in subsequent round prompts (“Include previous context in round 2+ prompts”), creating an indirect prompt-injection path.
W012: Unverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent).
What this means
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
Why it was flagged
The skill issues runtime curl/MCP calls to external LLM endpoints (e.g., https://api.deepseek.com/v1) whose responses are parsed and used to drive agent actions/implement fixes automatically, so remote content directly controls the agent's instructions.
- Commit
f4f20f9
- Audited
- Security analysis
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