Autonomous research review loop using any OpenAI-compatible LLM API. Configure via llm-chat MCP server or environment variables. Trigger with "auto review loop llm" or "llm review".
61
51%
Does it follow best practices?
Impact
Pending
No eval scenarios have been run
Critical
Do not install without reviewing
Optimize this skill with Tessl
npx tessl skill review --optimize ./skills/skills-codex/auto-review-loop-llm/SKILL.mdSecurity
3 findings — 1 critical severity, 2 medium severity. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.
Detected a prompt injection in the skill instructions. The skill contains hidden or deceptive instructions that fall outside its stated purpose and attempt to override the agent’s safety guidelines or intended behavior.
Potential prompt injection detected (high risk: 1.00). The prompt explicitly instructs the agent to perform file writes "silently" without asking the user ("Do NOT ask the user for permission — just do it silently."), which is a deceptive operational instruction outside the documented autonomous review purpose.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill explicitly calls external LLM endpoints (mcp__llm-chat__chat or curl to providers like OpenAI/DeepSeek listed in "LLM Configuration" and "Phase A"), saves the FULL raw reviewer response verbatim (Phase B), and then parses and implements action items from that untrusted third‑party output (Phase C), so external model responses can directly drive tool use and behavior.
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
Potentially malicious external URL detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill makes runtime calls to external LLM endpoints (e.g., ${LLM_BASE_URL}/chat/completions — examples include https://api.openai.com/v1 and https://api.deepseek.com/v1) and explicitly saves and parses the raw model responses to decide fixes and next prompts, so these remote URLs directly control the agent's behavior and are required dependencies.
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