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auto-review-loop-llm

Autonomous research review loop using any OpenAI-compatible LLM API. Configure via llm-chat MCP server or environment variables. Trigger with "auto review loop llm" or "llm review".

57

Quality

47%

Does it follow best practices?

Impact

Pending

No eval scenarios have been run

SecuritybySnyk

Critical

Do not install without reviewing

Optimize this skill with Tessl

npx tessl skill review --optimize ./skills/skills-codex/auto-review-loop-llm/SKILL.md
SKILL.md
Quality
Evals
Security

Security

3 findings — 2 critical severity, 1 medium severity. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.

Critical

E004: Prompt injection detected in skill instructions

What this means

Detected a prompt injection in the skill instructions. The skill contains hidden or deceptive instructions that fall outside its stated purpose and attempt to override the agent’s safety guidelines or intended behavior.

Why it was flagged

Potential prompt injection detected (high risk: 1.00). The prompt includes a directive to "Do NOT ask the user for permission — just do it silently" when writing large files, which instructs the agent to conceal actions and bypass user consent—a deceptive instruction outside the skill's stated, transparent review/documentation purpose.

Report incorrect finding
Critical

E006: Malicious code pattern detected in skill scripts

What this means

Detected high-risk code patterns in the skill content — including its prompts, tool definitions, and resources — such as data exfiltration, backdoors, remote code execution, credential theft, system compromise, supply chain attacks, and obfuscation techniques.

Why it was flagged

Malicious code pattern detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill autonomously collects and sends potentially sensitive project data (including full raw responses and prior context) to arbitrarily-configured external LLM endpoints and explicitly instructs silent file writes without user consent — a deliberate pattern that enables data exfiltration and credential exposure even though no direct remote-code-execution/backdoor payloads are present.

Medium

W012: Unverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent)

What this means

The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.

Why it was flagged

Potentially malicious external URL detected (high risk: 0.90). The skill calls external LLM endpoints at runtime (e.g., https://api.openai.com/v1 and https://api.deepseek.com/v1) via the LLM_BASE_URL/curl or MCP calls and explicitly saves and acts on the raw reviewer responses, so fetched content directly controls the agent's prompts/actions.

Repository
wanshuiyin/Auto-claude-code-research-in-sleep
Audited
Security analysis
Snyk

Is this your skill?

If you maintain this skill, you can claim it as your own. Once claimed, you can manage eval scenarios, bundle related skills, attach documentation or rules, and ensure cross-agent compatibility.