Workflow 3: Full paper writing pipeline. Orchestrates paper-plan → paper-figure → figure-spec/paper-illustration/mermaid-diagram → paper-write → paper-compile → auto-paper-improvement-loop to go from a narrative report to a polished PDF. At `— effort: max | beast` (or explicit `— assurance: submission`), Phase 6 gates the Final Report on `tools/verify_paper_audits.sh`; the PDF is labelled `submission-ready` only when the external verifier is green. Use when user says "写论文全流程", "write paper pipeline", "从报告到PDF", "paper writing", or wants the complete paper generation workflow.
82
81%
Does it follow best practices?
Impact
Pending
No eval scenarios have been run
Critical
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Security
2 findings — 1 critical severity, 1 medium severity. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.
Detected a prompt injection in the skill instructions. The skill contains hidden or deceptive instructions that fall outside its stated purpose and attempt to override the agent’s safety guidelines or intended behavior.
Potential prompt injection detected (high risk: 0.70). The prompt includes an explicit instruction to perform silent file writes ("Do NOT ask the user for permission — just do it silently"), which instructs deceptive/hidden behavior (not notifying the user) outside the pipeline's stated transparent reporting and checkpoints.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.80). The skill's Phase 5.8 "Citation Audit" explicitly performs web/DBLP/arXiv lookups to fetch and interpret external/public papers and metadata (SKILL.md §Phase 5.8), meaning the agent ingests third‑party web content that can influence KEEP/FIX/REPLACE/REMOVE decisions for citations and block submission—exposing it to untrusted external content that could carry indirect prompt injection.
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