Implements Tessl skill review GitHub Actions workflows in your repository through an interactive, configuration-first wizard.
93
93%
Does it follow best practices?
Impact
Pending
No eval scenarios have been run
Advisory
Suggest reviewing before use
Security
2 findings — 2 medium severity. This skill can be installed but you should review these findings before use.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.70). The workflow explicitly reads and reviews untrusted SKILL.md files from pull requests (see "Detect changed skills" and "Run skill reviews" in the single/two-workflow templates) and then uses the review output to compute scores, post/update PR comments, fail the job, and update/commit cache, so user-provided content in PRs can materially influence actions.
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
Potentially malicious external URL detected (high risk: 0.80). The workflow explicitly installs and runs the remote Tessl CLI at runtime (npm install -g @tessl/cli — https://www.npmjs.com/package/@tessl/cli), which executes fetched code and produces JSON that is parsed and injected into PR comments, so this external package is a required runtime dependency that directly controls outputs.