Security and Sandboxing

class SandboxedEnvironment(Environment):
    def __init__(self, **options):
        """
        Initialize sandboxed environment with security restrictions.
        
        Inherits all Environment parameters and adds security policies:
        - Restricts attribute access to safe attributes only
        - Limits range() function to MAX_RANGE items
        - Prevents access to private/internal attributes
        - Blocks dangerous method calls
        
        Parameters:
            **options: Same as Environment, plus security-specific options
        """

from jinja2.sandbox import SandboxedEnvironment
from jinja2 import DictLoader

# Create sandboxed environment
env = SandboxedEnvironment(
    loader=DictLoader({
        'user_template': '''
        Hello {{ user.name }}!
        Your items: {{ items | join(', ') }}
        Range: {{ range(5) | list }}
        '''
    })
)

# Safe template rendering with untrusted input
template = env.from_string('Hello {{ name | upper }}!')
result = template.render(name='<script>alert("xss")</script>')
# Result: Hello &lt;SCRIPT&gt;ALERT(&quot;XSS&quot;)&lt;/SCRIPT&gt;!

def safe_range(*args):
    """
    Safe range function with configurable limits.
    
    Parameters:
        *args: Same as built-in range() function
        
    Returns:
        range: Range object limited to MAX_RANGE items
        
    Raises:
        OverflowError: If range exceeds MAX_RANGE limit
    """

def is_internal_attribute(obj, attr):
    """
    Check if attribute is considered internal/private.
    
    Parameters:
        obj: Object being accessed
        attr: Attribute name
        
    Returns:
        bool: True if attribute should be blocked
    """

def modifies_known_mutable(obj, attr):
    """
    Check if accessing attribute/method modifies known mutable objects.
    
    Parameters:
        obj: Object being accessed
        attr: Attribute/method name
        
    Returns:
        bool: True if access modifies the object
    """

MAX_RANGE = 100000  # Maximum range size allowed

UNSAFE_FUNCTION_ATTRIBUTES = frozenset([
    '__call__', '__code__', '__closure__', '__defaults__',
    '__globals__', '__dict__', '__annotations__'
])

UNSAFE_METHOD_ATTRIBUTES = frozenset([
    '__func__', '__self__', '__code__', '__closure__',
    '__defaults__', '__globals__'
])

UNSAFE_GENERATOR_ATTRIBUTES = frozenset([
    'gi_frame', 'gi_code', 'gi_locals', 'gi_yieldfrom'
])

UNSAFE_COROUTINE_ATTRIBUTES = frozenset([
    'cr_frame', 'cr_code', 'cr_locals', 'cr_origin'
])

UNSAFE_ASYNC_GENERATOR_ATTRIBUTES = frozenset([
    'ag_frame', 'ag_code', 'ag_locals'
])

from jinja2.sandbox import SandboxedEnvironment

class CustomSandboxedEnvironment(SandboxedEnvironment):
    def is_safe_attribute(self, obj, attr, value):
        """
        Override attribute safety checking.
        
        Parameters:
            obj: Object being accessed
            attr: Attribute name
            value: Attribute value
            
        Returns:
            bool: True if attribute access is safe
        """
        # Allow access to specific safe attributes
        if attr in ('safe_method', 'allowed_property'):
            return True
        
        # Block access to sensitive attributes
        if attr.startswith('_secret'):
            return False
        
        # Delegate to parent implementation
        return super().is_safe_attribute(obj, attr, value)
    
    def is_safe_callable(self, obj):
        """
        Override callable safety checking.
        
        Parameters:
            obj: Callable object
            
        Returns:
            bool: True if callable is safe to execute
        """
        # Allow specific safe functions
        if hasattr(obj, '__name__') and obj.__name__ in ('safe_func', 'allowed_func'):
            return True
        
        # Block dangerous callables
        if hasattr(obj, '__name__') and obj.__name__ in ('exec', 'eval', 'compile'):
            return False
        
        return super().is_safe_callable(obj)

# Usage
env = CustomSandboxedEnvironment()

class AllowlistSandboxedEnvironment(SandboxedEnvironment):
    # Define allowed attributes per type
    ALLOWED_ATTRIBUTES = {
        str: {'upper', 'lower', 'strip', 'split', 'join', 'replace'},
        list: {'append', 'extend', 'count', 'index'},
        dict: {'get', 'keys', 'values', 'items'},
        # Add more types as needed
    }
    
    # Define allowed global functions
    ALLOWED_FUNCTIONS = {
        'len', 'abs', 'min', 'max', 'sum', 'sorted', 'reversed'
    }
    
    def is_safe_attribute(self, obj, attr, value):
        obj_type = type(obj)
        allowed = self.ALLOWED_ATTRIBUTES.get(obj_type, set())
        return attr in allowed
    
    def is_safe_callable(self, obj):
        if hasattr(obj, '__name__'):
            return obj.__name__ in self.ALLOWED_FUNCTIONS
        return False

class ContextAwareSandboxedEnvironment(SandboxedEnvironment):
    def __init__(self, **options):
        super().__init__(**options)
        self.security_context = {
            'trusted_users': set(),
            'admin_mode': False
        }
    
    def is_safe_attribute(self, obj, attr, value):
        # More permissive for trusted users
        if self.security_context.get('admin_mode'):
            return not attr.startswith('__')
        
        # Strict checking for untrusted users
        return super().is_safe_attribute(obj, attr, value)
    
    def set_security_context(self, **context):
        """Update security context for current request."""
        self.security_context.update(context)

# Usage
env = ContextAwareSandboxedEnvironment()

# For trusted admin user
env.set_security_context(admin_mode=True)
template = env.from_string('{{ obj.admin_method() }}')

# For regular user
env.set_security_context(admin_mode=False)
template = env.from_string('{{ obj.safe_method() }}')

from jinja2.sandbox import SandboxedEnvironment
from markupsafe import escape
import re

def sanitize_input(value):
    """Sanitize user input for safe template rendering."""
    if isinstance(value, str):
        # Remove potentially dangerous characters
        value = re.sub(r'[<>"\']', '', value)
        # Limit length
        value = value[:1000]
    return value

def safe_render(template_str, **context):
    """Safely render template with sanitized context."""
    env = SandboxedEnvironment(autoescape=True)
    
    # Sanitize all context values
    safe_context = {}
    for key, value in context.items():
        if isinstance(value, (str, int, float, bool, list, dict)):
            safe_context[key] = sanitize_input(value)
    
    template = env.from_string(template_str)
    return template.render(**safe_context)

def validate_template_source(source):
    """
    Validate template source for security issues.
    
    Returns:
        tuple: (is_safe, issues) where is_safe is bool and issues is list of problems
    """
    issues = []
    
    # Check for dangerous patterns
    dangerous_patterns = [
        r'\{%\s*include\s+["\'][^"\']*/\.\./',  # Path traversal
        r'\{%\s*extends\s+["\'][^"\']*/\.\./',   # Path traversal
        r'__[a-zA-Z_]+__',                        # Dunder attributes
        r'\bexec\b|\beval\b|\bcompile\b',        # Dangerous functions
    ]
    
    for pattern in dangerous_patterns:
        if re.search(pattern, source):
            issues.append(f'Potentially dangerous pattern: {pattern}')
    
    # Check template size
    if len(source) > 50000:  # 50KB limit
        issues.append('Template source too large')
    
    return len(issues) == 0, issues

# Usage
source = '{{ user.name }} - {{ items | length }}'
is_safe, issues = validate_template_source(source)
if is_safe:
    env = SandboxedEnvironment()
    template = env.from_string(source)
else:
    print(f'Template validation failed: {issues}')

import signal
import time
from contextlib import contextmanager

class ResourceLimitedSandboxedEnvironment(SandboxedEnvironment):
    def __init__(self, max_execution_time=5, **options):
        super().__init__(**options)
        self.max_execution_time = max_execution_time
    
    @contextmanager
    def execution_timeout(self):
        """Context manager for limiting execution time."""
        def timeout_handler(signum, frame):
            raise TimeoutError('Template execution timeout')
        
        old_handler = signal.signal(signal.SIGALRM, timeout_handler)
        signal.alarm(self.max_execution_time)
        
        try:
            yield
        finally:
            signal.alarm(0)
            signal.signal(signal.SIGALRM, old_handler)
    
    def render_with_limits(self, template_str, **context):
        """Render template with resource limits."""
        template = self.from_string(template_str)
        
        with self.execution_timeout():
            return template.render(**context)

# Usage
env = ResourceLimitedSandboxedEnvironment(max_execution_time=3)
try:
    result = env.render_with_limits('{{ range(1000000) | list | length }}')  # This might timeout
except TimeoutError:
    print('Template execution took too long')

class SecurityPolicy:
    """
    Security policy configuration for sandboxed environments.
    
    Attributes:
        max_range_size: Maximum allowed range size
        allowed_attributes: Set of allowed attribute names
        blocked_attributes: Set of blocked attribute names
        allowed_functions: Set of allowed function names
        blocked_functions: Set of blocked function names
        enable_auto_escape: Enable automatic HTML escaping
    """

class SecurityViolation(Exception):
    """
    Exception raised when sandbox security policy is violated.
    
    Attributes:
        object: Object that caused the violation
        attribute: Attribute that was accessed (if applicable)
        message: Detailed violation message
    """

class SandboxContext:
    """
    Security context for sandbox execution.
    
    Attributes:
        user_id: Current user identifier
        permissions: Set of user permissions
        trust_level: User trust level (0-100)
        source_origin: Origin of template source
    """