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vitron-ai/alethia

Agent-native E2E runtime with verifiable safety. 16 MCP tools including alethia_propose_tests (agent generates tests from a URL), alethia_assert_safety (proves destructive actions are blocked), and the expect block: NLP primitive unique to Alethia. Zero-IPC; 2-5x faster than Playwright MCP per flow; signed evidence packs. Works with Claude Code, Cursor, Cline.

95

2.80x
Quality

94%

Does it follow best practices?

Impact

98%

2.80x

Average score across 5 eval scenarios

SecuritybySnyk

Low

Low-risk findings worth noting

Overview
Quality
Evals
Security
Files
Low

W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).

What this means

The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.

Why it was flagged

The SKILL.md explicitly instructs the agent to call alethia_propose_tests / alethia_assert_safety with an arbitrary target URL and to consume returned pageContext (title, headings, buttons, inputs), PlanRun step results, and screenshots—i.e., it fetches and interprets untrusted third‑party web pages as part of its workflow, which can materially influence subsequent actions.

Where we found it

arbitrary target URL

url · 7 sites

The SKILL.md explicitly instructs the agent to call alethia_propose_tests and alethia_assert_safety with an arbitrary user-provided target URL, then consume returned pageContext (title, headings, buttons, inputs), PlanRun step results, and screenshots — fetching and interpreting untrusted third-party web content that can influence subsequent agent actions.

Report incorrect finding
Audited
Security analysis
Snyk