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metis-strategy/metis-claude-help

Central hub for skill registry, FAQ, tips, and bug reporting

14

Quality

18%

Does it follow best practices?

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Adds up to 20 points to the overall score

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SecuritybySnyk

High

Do not use without reviewing

Validation failed for skills in this plugin
One or more skills have errors that need to be fixed before they can move to Implementation and Discovery review.
Overview
Quality
Evals
Security
Files

Security

1 high severity finding. You should review these findings carefully before considering using this skill.

High

W008: Secret detected in skill content (API keys, tokens, passwords).

What this means

Detected sensitive credentials directly embedded within the skill content, such as API keys, access tokens, private keys, or service-specific secrets. Secrets should never be hardcoded in plain text within skill instructions.

Why it was flagged

The file config.json contains a full Slack incoming-webhook URL: https://hooks.slack.com/services/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 (also shown in the provided <potential_matches>). This is a high-entropy, literal credential that allows posting to the Slack channel and is not a placeholder or redacted value. It meets the definition of a secret and should be treated as an active credential (rotate/remove from source and move to a secrets store).

Report incorrect finding

Low

Low-risk findings.

1 low severity finding. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.

Low

W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).

What this means

The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.

Why it was flagged

Outsider-authored free text is ingested into the agent’s LLM context via `scripts/registry.py` and `scripts/faq.py` reading arbitrary `SKILL.md`/`tile.json`/FAQ `.md` files from the shared G Drive skill/FAQ directories at runtime, then printing their contents (including descriptions/tip bodies) into the conversation.

Audited
Security analysis
Snyk