Multi-LLM craftsmanship council with live progress and debate mode for code review and design questions
48
60%
Does it follow best practices?
Impact
—
No eval scenarios have been run
Advisory
Suggest reviewing before use
Security
2 findings — 2 medium severity. This skill can be installed but you should review these findings before use.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Third-party content exposure detected (high risk: 0.80). The protocol explicitly instructs running "uvx star-chamber" (Step 3), which installs and executes the star-chamber package from PyPI (a public third‑party package repo) and therefore causes the agent to fetch and run untrusted third‑party code that can materially influence subsequent behavior.
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
Potentially malicious external URL detected (high risk: 0.80). The skill's setup includes a runtime installation command that fetches and executes a remote script ("curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh"), which would run external code needed for the uvx/uv tool the skill requires.