Use when the user asks about the "Welcome to AI Native DevCon" talk introducing Slick (slick.com) — a browser-native agent that controls the browser it runs in. Covers Slick's architecture (sprinkles, scoops, licks, the cone), how it uses HTTP / Chrome Debug Protocol / WebRTC, pyagent as the agentic loop, skills as "step zero of agent enablement", MCP and webMCP support, remote-controlling Electron apps (Slack, Teams, Claude desktop) via Slick Star, ad hoc generative UI, OAuth token handling, and verbatim quotes from the talk. Also use when the user wants to apply this browser-native agent approach to their own work.
71
88%
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Critical
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The canonical home for this skill is ainativedev/aidevcon-2026-ldn
Security
1 critical severity finding. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.
Detected high-risk code patterns in the skill content — including its prompts, tool definitions, and resources — such as data exfiltration, backdoors, remote code execution, credential theft, system compromise, supply chain attacks, and obfuscation techniques.
The materials describe deliberate techniques for injecting code into Electron apps, bypassing protective "fuses", intercepting app events and forwarding them to public webhooks, and executing arbitrary shell/HTTP/CDP actions — capabilities that enable unauthorized access, remote code execution, and data exfiltration.
Low
Low-risk findings.
2 low severity findings. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
[The talk describes Slick’s browser-native agent and its ability to receive “webhooks” (public URLs) that “send a post to that particular webhook…which is then going to…go to the agent,” meaning outsider-authored free text can be posted into the workflow via the webhook source without the agent selecting a specific trusted item first.]
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
The transcript (transcript.md:27) states "we have a host on slick.ai" that provides public webhooks which receive HTTP POSTs and forward events into the agent at runtime—i.e., an external URL (slick.ai) is used during runtime to send events that directly control agent behavior.
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