Use when the user asks about Oleg Šelajev's talk "You're absolutely right, it was your home directory!" (ext live / Testkube conference, 2026) — including questions about Docker Sandboxes, running AI agents in microVM isolation, the trifecta of agent risks (sensitive data + external comms + untrusted content), why containers aren't enough for agent isolation, SBX kits, secret injection / sentinel values, prompt injection horror stories, YOLO mode agents, or applying his sandboxing workflow to the user's own agent setup.
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Low-risk findings worth noting
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tessl review fix ./talk-selajev-docker-sandboxes-agents/SKILL.mdLow
Low-risk findings.
1 low severity finding. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
The runtime workflow ingests outsider-authored free text via the user/agent-submitted skill/demo payload included in the transcript (“prompt injection” email/GitHub handles seed), which demonstrates an attacker can supply arbitrary text to the agent through the skill input path.
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