Agent release gate

Product-level sanity QA for the agent runtime, one layer below the playground UI. The question is not "is every detail right" — it is "if a user opens the product and does the obvious first things, do they work?" This is the gate a release passes before shipping.

Every check asserts on the wire (the SSE frame types the browser sees) and on side effects (the file really persisted, the revision really incremented) — never on what the model says. That makes it deployment-agnostic: point it at any stack and the assertions still hold.

Run it

Set three environment variables for the deployment under test, then run the gate:

export AGENTA_BASE=https://your-stack.example.com   # deployment origin
export AGENTA_PROJECT_ID=...                         # target project
export AGENTA_API_KEY=...                            # project API key

uv run resources/qa_product.py --all --custom-slug <vault-slug> --custom-name "<display-name>" --require-store  # everything
uv run resources/qa_product.py --cell P1                         # one cell
uv run resources/qa_product.py --cell C1 --only chat              # one journey
uv run resources/qa_product.py --cell S2 --only warm --only cold1 --require-store  # continuity

EXPORT the three variables, do not just set them. The driver falls back to an env FILE when AGENTA_* is absent from its environment, which is helpful interactively and dangerous in a release run: a credentials file of bare KEY=value lines sourced with . file sets the shell only, the child uv run process inherits nothing, and the driver silently runs the whole gate against WHATEVER DEPLOYMENT the fallback file names. The failure surfaces as 401 Invalid credentials from a stage whose key you just watched answer 200, or worse as a green run recorded against the wrong stack. Use set -a around the source, or export each variable, and confirm the stage in the results before trusting them. (Cost a staging gate run on 2026-08-28; the fallback degrades to "wrong deployment", never to "no credentials".)

Paths are relative to this skill's directory. The deployment's vault must hold the provider keys the cells use (Anthropic / OpenAI / OpenRouter). If the three env vars are unset the driver stops immediately and names exactly what is missing; a legacy --env-file <path> fallback also exists. --all includes cells P2, P2b, and P3 (a custom OpenAI-compatible provider, with P2 and P2b running locally and P3 on Daytona), which need a vault slug passed via --custom-slug; the driver fails fast if it's missing. --custom-name is also required because model_keys is built from the display name rather than the stable slug. Custom-provider cells skip the credential-rotation journey because their value is write-only and cannot be safely restored. Cells S1, S2 and C1 additionally need the subscription sidecar logged in on the target deployment — see resources/coverage.md for what each cell requires. The Daytona cells (C2, C4, P3, X2) additionally run the secret_opaque journey and need the runner's Daytona API key to manage Secrets, because credential hiding is on by default; without it those cells fail at sandbox creation with an error naming the permission.

The one flag a release conductor must not skip past. The continuity journeys (warm, cold1, cold2) only mean anything on a store-backed deployment: with no object store the runner degrades silently to an ephemeral working directory, so those journeys SKIP by default and FAIL with --require-store. Run the gate against a deployment with AGENTA_STORE_* configured and pass --require-store, or the greenest possible run still says nothing about durability. cold2 additionally needs an operator hook that SIGKILLs the runner replica (--cold2-replace-cmd) and SKIPs without it.

The flag that makes the gate fit the release: --release-base. The matrix is fixed, so without it a release that reworked a subsystem gets exactly the coverage of a release that did not touch it. Pass the ref the release branches from, and the driver reads the release's own changed paths, matches them against the rules in resources/path_triggers.py, and makes the cells those rules name MANDATORY for this run:

uv run resources/qa_product.py --all --release-base origin/main --require-store   # every release run
uv run resources/path_triggers.py --release-base origin/main                      # preview only, runs nothing

A mandatory cell that lives in qa_product.py is added to the run even when --cell did not ask for it. A mandatory cell that is a standalone matrix_*.py script is a separate process the driver cannot observe, so it is printed, written to mandatory.json, and listed in summary.md under "Mandatory for this release" — the release is not green until each of those has a recorded result of its own. If a rule names a cell that does not exist, the driver stops before running anything and says so: the release changed code a rule protects and the coverage was never written, which is the one outcome that must never read as green. Add --changed-path to state paths by hand where the checkout is not the release branch. With no --release-base and no --changed-path nothing changes, so every existing invocation behaves exactly as before.

Adding a rule is one line in PATH_TRIGGERS (a glob, and the cells it makes mandatory) plus the cell it names. Matching is fnmatch over the whole repo-relative path, so * crosses directory separators and a/b/* covers the whole subtree; write ** so a subtree rule reads as one.

Reading the result. Each journey prints PASS, FAIL, or SKIP with a one-line reason, and a per-cell markdown table lands with the full JSON in ./qa-gate-runs/<timestamp>/ (override the location with AGENTA_QA_RUNS_DIR). Runs are written to the current working directory, never into the skill. SKIP is expected where a journey does not apply to a cell (for example mcp on any Pi cell — user MCP is Claude-only). Any FAIL blocks the release until triaged.

A SKIPped integration test in a security- or concurrency-bearing area is a FAILURE in your summary line, not green. State it as "N passed, M skipped OF WHICH k are untested claims" and name the k. A commit-lock race test skipping for want of a reachable Postgres is exactly how a one-line syntax error (SET LOCAL lock_timeout with a bind parameter, which Postgres rejects outright) survived 1911 green tests before a human hit it as his first live action.

The two journeys that run many things at once: burst and crosstalk. Every other journey drives one run at a time, so the gate only ever saw faults that reproduce on a quiet deployment. The credential-delivery fault of AGE-4249 does not: about one production first message in five failed because some fresh Daytona sandboxes start without their Secret substitution wiring, and per cold sandbox that is roughly an 8 percent fault. burst sends 16 first messages at the same time on 16 brand new sessions, so the run buys 16 cold starts instead of one. crosstalk runs 3 two-turn conversations with long output beside 2 approval flows, and checks that no stream carries another session's nonce, except on the codex harness, where the gate rides a platform tool with empty arguments, so the approval command carries no nonce and isolation is not checked there (nonce_checked=false). Both are Daytona-only by default and skip elsewhere; both report the runner's stable error code per run, so a credential_delivery_failed names itself.

uv run resources/qa_product.py --cell C4 --only burst --only crosstalk
uv run resources/qa_product.py --cell C4 --only burst --burst-size 24         # more cold starts
uv run resources/qa_product.py --cell C3 --only crosstalk --concurrency-everywhere  # local too
uv run resources/test_qa_product_concurrency.py                               # offline tests

Read a green burst honestly. At an 8 percent per-cold-start fault rate, 8 runs miss the fault 51 percent of the time, 16 miss it 26 percent, and two Daytona cells at 16 miss it about 7 percent. A PASS is a sample, not an all-clear, and the result says so in its own reason line. A FAIL is proof.

Each concurrent run holds its own Daytona sandbox, about 5 GiB of the organization's disk, and a parked sandbox keeps counting until its auto-delete window closes, so a burst of 16 is about 80 GiB in flight. The counts are --burst-size (default 16), --crosstalk-conversations (default 3) and --crosstalk-approvals (default 2). The cap is 32 concurrent runs: 32 for the burst size, and 32 for the two crosstalk counts TOGETHER, because what costs disk is what runs at once. When the provider refuses on capacity the journey reports SKIP with a loud reason, never a PASS or a FAIL, because nothing about the product was measured. --concurrency-timeout (default 300s) bounds one TURN and rides into the stream as an absolute deadline, so a two-turn crosstalk run gets twice that and a stream that never ends is abandoned rather than followed.

A release that changes services/runner/src/engines/sandbox_agent/** or services/runner/src/providers/daytona* makes the Daytona cells C2, C4 and X2 mandatory through path_triggers.py, and forces burst and crosstalk into the run even when --only named something else. That is how these journeys reach a release that needs them.

Before a human gets a deployment URL, run resources/qa_commit_approval.py too. It is not part of qa_product.py's cell × journey matrix — none of that matrix's journeys drive a live turn against a REAL, saved workflow revision (the commit journey only exercises the REST API; chat, tool, approve/deny all run against an inline, unsaved config), so nothing else in the gate observes the S3b single-use execution-authorization gate actually firing around a real config mutation. This script does: create a real workflow + revision, invoke a live agent turn that calls read_config then commit_revision, expect the pause, approve it in-band, and verify the new revision landed with REST fetch-back. Treat a FAIL here as blocking, the same as any other gate FAIL.

Tiers: coached vs. mechanism-blind

Every cell in this gate (qa_product.py's journeys, qa_commit_approval.py, qa_probe.py, and all matrix_w*.py cells) declares which of two tiers it belongs to, in its own docstring:

• Coached (backend-path test). The prompt names the mechanism verbatim — which tool, which operation, which target path. This proves OUR CODE works (the gate, the base check, the authorization handoff, the sandbox path) when the right call is made. It proves NOTHING about whether a model finds that call from a plain-language human ask.
• Mechanism-blind (model-behavior test). The prompt is phrased the way a real user types — no tool names, no operation names, no schema hints. Only these cells license a claim about what the model can do unprompted.

Rule: claims of model behavior may only cite mechanism-blind cells. Most cells in this directory are coached tier — they test backend paths, correctly, but do not stand in for model-discovery evidence. The gap this rule exists to close, found live: asked in plain words to "add the skill I saved in your folder," Haiku invented a nonexistent marker syntax ({"@ag.embed": {"@ag.references": ...}}) and the engine accepted it as literal data — a failure none of the coached cells (including matrix_w7.py, whose prompt names @ag.file outright) could ever have caught, because they never test whether the model reaches for the real mechanism on its own. resources/matrix_g1_guidance_discovery.py is this directory's first mechanism-blind cell, promoted after the platform-guidance fix closed that exact gap; it reuses qa_matrix_lib.py the same way the separate one-shot benchmark (Tier B) does — check there before writing a new mechanism-blind cell from scratch, to avoid duplicating scaffolding.

Session control cells

resources/session_control.py is a second, standalone driver: sixteen cells that cover Stop, durable commands, and the runner's recovery paths (owner release, park/resume, watchdog quarantine). It drives the same product endpoint and asserts on the same wire, but it needs its own account bootstrap, so it runs as a separate process rather than as qa_product.py cells. See resources/path_triggers.py for the exact mandatory-cell mechanism.

These cells are MANDATORY — run them, not just the standing gate — whenever the release diff touches any of:

• services/runner/src/sessions/**
• services/runner/src/engines/sandbox_agent/**
• api/oss/src/core/sessions/**
• api/oss/src/tasks/asyncio/sessions/**
• api/oss/src/apis/fastapi/sessions/**

Run every cell with one line:

uv run resources/session_control.py --cells all --harness pi_core --sandbox local

Add --project <docker-compose project name> to run the eight cells that need direct Docker and Postgres access (sandbox-gone, records-outage, restart-after-stop, runner-gone, runner-gone-late, post-stop-row, codex-child, stale-tail) and the abort-log subcheck inside stop-after-finish. Without --project, those eight cells SKIP with a named reason. The stop-after-finish HTTP check still runs, but only its abort-log subcheck is unavailable. The other eight cells (stop-warm, double-send, stale-stop, stop-approval, stop-after-finish, repeat-stop, concurrent-stops, stop-during-completion) run over HTTP alone against any deployment. Add --resume <path to a prior run's results.json> to pick a lost run back up: any cell already recorded there is loaded instead of re-run.

Results land in a timestamped folder under ~/agenta-qa-evidence/ (override with AGENTA_QA_RUNS_DIR), as results.json and summary.md — the same PASS/FAIL/SKIP shape as the rest of the gate. When a release path makes session control mandatory, pass that artifact to the standing gate with --session-control-results <path>: a missing or incomplete artifact stops the gate before the matrix runs, and a recorded FAIL makes the final gate exit nonzero.

Environment, by name. Same three-variable discipline as the rest of the gate, no env-file fallback:

• AGENTA_BASE — the deployment origin.
• AGENTA_ADMIN_KEY — mints the ephemeral account this driver runs under. Lives in ~/.agenta-qa-secrets.env.
• QA_OPENAI_API_KEY — stocked into that account's vault so the pi_core and codex harnesses have a provider key. Lives in ~/.agenta-qa-openai.env.
• ANTHROPIC_API_KEY — only required for --harness claude, stocked into the same vault the same way. Lives in ~/.agenta-qa-secrets.env. A pi_core- or codex-only run does not need it.

A Daytona run additionally needs a Secrets-capable Daytona key on the runner; the key in most session env files returns 403 on the Secrets endpoint, so check that before trusting a Daytona result.

When results lie

The runtime fails open: a component can break, get logged, and the turn still succeeds with a normal-looking answer. A green turn is therefore not proof on its own. Before trusting a pass, read resources/LESSONS.md — every trap there produced a green test that proved nothing. The three that bite hardest: replay conversation history byte-faithfully (tool parts included) or every turn silently goes cold; re-run any prior blocker-level finding after a redeploy before believing it; and a multi-turn check that never leaves the warm daemon, on a deployment with no object store, proves nothing about the durable working directory (LESSONS #16).

Resources (read on demand)

• resources/coverage.md — the cells (harness × sandbox × auth), the journeys (chat, mount, tool, approve, deny, commit, warm, cold1, cold2, mcp) with a one-line meaning for each, the continuity tiers and their method, and a table of what each cell needs beyond the three env vars.

• resources/LESSONS.md — the traps. Read before writing or trusting any agent QA test.

• resources/qa_product.py — the gate driver (cells × journeys).

• resources/matrix_gw1_gateway_tools.py — [coached, with one mechanism-blind leg] the gateway tool surface against a real provider: search filters by policy (the denied key never reaches the model), an allowed tool executes unattended with a genuine provider result, and an ask-tier tool parks with the right stored identity and is answered through the interactions API — the durable plane a reloaded browser uses, which no other cell covers. The fixed matrix proves approvals with a builtin, so nothing else notices when the compiled policy and the enforced policy drift apart. Defaults to the no-auth text_to_pdf connection; --integration and --connection point it elsewhere. SKIPs, naming the fixture, when no valid connection exists, and SKIPs rather than failing the release when the model provider itself errors. Made mandatory by the gateway rule in path_triggers.py.

• resources/path_triggers.py — the path-scoped rules: one dict mapping a path glob to the cells a release must run when its diff touches that glob, plus the two functions the driver calls. Runs standalone as a preview (--release-base <ref>). Add a rule here whenever new coverage is only meaningful for changes in one part of the tree.

• resources/qa_probe.py — a one-turn wire probe: uv run resources/qa_probe.py confirms the product path answers at all before running the full gate.

• resources/qa_commit_approval.py — [coached] the mandatory pre-handoff commit-approval round trip (see above). Self-contained; does not import qa_product.py.

• resources/qa_matrix_lib.py — shared helpers (session/turn plumbing, workflow/revision REST calls, the multi-round approval loop) for the matrix_w*.py adversarial cells below. Import only, no CLI. It also holds the two cross-cutting invariants every cell should fold into its verdict — check_no_blank_success_on_refusal and check_no_silent_turn (see below). If you write a new cell, wire check_no_silent_turn into its PASS condition.

• resources/matrix_w3.py — [coached, with a narrow mechanism-blind sliver] two sessions, disjoint edits; session B is given a stale base_revision_id and ZERO coaching on recovery. Two-tier pass: autonomous correct recovery passes outright; a model that diagnoses the 409 correctly and asks before re-attempting a config write ALSO passes (that is desirable caution, not a failure) once one bare "yes, retry" permission (no mechanics) completes the recovery. Guards both the optimistic-concurrency base check and the instructive-error design (a 409 must be readable without coaching). The initial action in both sessions is still coached — only the RECOVERY step is mechanism-blind; don't cite this cell for "the model finds commit_revision unprompted."

• resources/matrix_w4.py — [coached] a pending approval whose base goes stale while it waits (a second session commits first); the EXECUTE-time check must catch it, not just the gate-time check.

• resources/matrix_w5.py — [coached] interrupt a running turn (steer) then use the session again. Caught a real bug: the durable mount never gets re-established after a steer, breaking every subsequent turn on that session. Distinct from Mahmoud's own steer repro (that one is a turn-currency/heartbeat bug; this is a mount-lifecycle bug) — keep the two separate when triaging.

• resources/matrix_w7.py — [coached] an agent writes a workspace file and commits it via an @ag.file marker; asserts the approval manifest carries digest+bytes and the commit lands with the exact bytes. Caught a real bug (fixed, PR #5763-adjacent runner fix): the gate approved cleanly but execution always refused with authorization_missing — no file-marker commit could land. Re-verified PASS after the fix. Note: DEFERRED_NOT_EXECUTED on a queued second tool call is benign (another gate is already pending), not a real tool error — don't let it fail this cell. Naming @ag.file verbatim in the prompt is correct for this cell's backend-path purpose but means it cannot catch a model failing to find the marker syntax unprompted — see Tiers above.

• resources/matrix_w1_daytona.py — [coached] the commit round-trip on sandbox=daytona (every other cell runs local). Needs a funded provider vault key (see the file's own docstring for the exact vault-secret shape and the provider_key slug gotcha). PASS confirms DaytonaWorkspaceReader and the placeholder-secrets flow live.

• resources/matrix_t8_saved_files.py — [coached] T8: the Daytona remote agent mount (the durable agent-files/ folder the playground file drawer writes into), which needs the ngrok tunnel the runner discovers at sandbox-acquire time. Writes a marker file into the mount via the mounts API (POST /mounts/agents/sign + PUT /mounts/{id}/files) before the run, then asserts the runner log line remote agent mount active for artifact=<id> appears, a tool output actually carries the real marker content (not hallucinated), and the commit lands with it. Verified PASS 3/3 runs after the tunnel-seat fix (2026-08-06); this line was absent on every attempt before that fix landed.

• resources/matrix_t9_agent_tools.py — [coached] T9: the runner restores the agent's own tools from agent-files/.tools/ before a session (agent-tools-setup.ts). Plants a setup.sh and a bin/qa-tool through the mounts API, opens a fresh session, and asserts the first tool call is the exact probe and its output payload carries both planted tokens, plus a line setup.sh appended to agent-files/.tools/runs.log, read back through the mounts API with no model in the loop, plus the agent_tools_setup stage for THIS session in the runner log when --runner-container is given. --sandbox local|daytona, --harness pi_core|claude. Mandatory (via path_triggers.py) when the restore step or the sandbox image recipes change.

• resources/matrix_w7_per_harness.py — [coached] matrix_w7.py's exact scenario run identically on all three harnesses (claude, codex, pi_core), each classified PASS/FAIL/SKIP independently. Exists because W7 originally ran on Claude only, and that scenario-coverage gap is exactly what let the Codex approve-then-fail P0 (2026-08-06) ship: commit_revision + file marker + HITL approval on a harness this suite never exercised. claude uses subscription auth (no vault dependency); codex and pi_core need a funded OpenAI provider_key vault secret (mirrors cells X1/C3 in qa_product.py) and correctly SKIP with the exact reason when it's missing or ambiguous — a SKIP here is an untested harness, not a pass, and must be named as such in any release summary. --only <harness> runs a single leg without re-spending budget on the others. Verified PASS on claude (2026-08-06). codex/pi initially SKIPPED on this shared preview stack because its vault held zero — then, transiently, an ambiguous multiple — OpenAI candidates (other concurrent agents' activity on the same shared project); resolved 2026-08-06 by stocking one unambiguous OpenAI provider_key secret (no stale entries existed to remove). Re-verified PASS on codex after stocking the key (session 58ce3a58-8d04-40ac-99e4-c44eaa5d7b06).

• resources/matrix_w7_daytona.py — [coached] matrix_w7.py's exact scenario with sandbox=daytona instead of local. The local-only original W7 is exactly why this bug hid: the Daytona transport rejects NUL bytes in argv, which the @ag.file manifest walk was emitting, so no workspace-file commit could EVER land on Daytona, on any harness, until the 2026-08-06 fix (found during the same P0 triage, live-verified twice on codex+Daytona: sessions f3fa4335, f2f22056). This cell is the sandbox-axis regression guard, staying on the claude harness. Needs the same funded Anthropic vault key as matrix_w1_daytona.py. Verified PASS (2026-08-06).

• resources/matrix_invariant_commit_auth_refusal.py — [coached scenario; the invariant itself is mechanism-level] the generic invariant: no tool_result with empty output and isError:false may exist for a call whose runner log says [commit-auth] refused (the silent-blank-success class — the P0's actual failure shape, distinct from the scenario-coverage gap matrix_w7_per_harness.py addresses). The check itself (qa_matrix_lib.check_no_blank_success_on_refusal) reads the runner's own log line against the wire outcome and is meant to be reusable by any cell that exercises marker-carrying commits, not just this one. This cell's trigger is best-effort: run W7's flow, let the legitimate commit consume its authorization record, then REPLAY the byte-identical approval-carrying request (a duplicate submission) hoping to force a second, doomed authorizeExecution attempt. Verified 2026-08-06: the replay did NOT reproduce a refusal (the runner treats the identical replayed history as already-resolved and answers conversationally instead of re-invoking the tool), so the cell correctly SKIPped rather than claiming a false pass on an invariant it never exercised. A reliable deterministic trigger (e.g. a genuine cold-resume stale-approval replay, or a crafted duplicate toolCallId) is an open follow-up; until then, treat any SKIP from this cell as "the invariant was not tested this run," never as green.

• qa_matrix_lib.check_no_silent_turn(turns) — [mechanism-level invariant; no cell of its own] no turn may come back completely bare: no text, no tool call, no approval gate, no file or data payload, and no error. That combination is a swallowed provider failure (ASD-EST100) — the model call is rejected, the error is dropped on the way back, and the turn is reported as a clean empty finish, so the user sees a blank bubble with no reason anywhere. It matters most in cells whose PASS depends on something NOT appearing (no error, no leak, no blank success): a turn that produced nothing satisfies those by doing nothing at all. Its content definition deliberately mirrors content_parts_emitted in the product's own Vercel egress (sdks/python/agenta/sdk/agents/adapters/vercel/stream.py) — reasoning does NOT count, so a turn that only thought is still a violation. Wired into matrix_w7*.py, matrix_t8_saved_files.py, matrix_b1_builtin_find.py, matrix_invariant_commit_auth_refusal.py, matrix_l3_abandoned_approval.py, matrix_w3.py, matrix_w4.py and matrix_w5.py as ... and not silent["violations"]; add the same conjunct to any new cell. The one thing a cell must exclude itself is a turn it deliberately aborted or interrupted, which legitimately ends bare — matrix_w5.py shows the pattern (it checks only its post-interrupt turns).

• resources/matrix_g1_guidance_discovery.py — [mechanism-blind] does the platform guidance actually change what the model does? The trial prompt is Mahmoud's own verbatim phrasing from the live session that found the bug ("can you add gstack-autoplan skill to your skills (i saved it in your folder)") — no tool, operation, or marker syntax named. Before the guidance existed, this exact phrasing made a model copy the skill into its own harness-local skills folder and claim success without ever proposing a commit, 3/3 live (session b59cb549). Two parts per harness/model/sandbox leg: PROBE reads the rendered instructions file out of the workspace and asserts the fenced platform-guidance block and the skill-location sentence are really there; TRIALS run the prompt N times, PASS only when a commit_revision gate fires, is approved, and the STORED revision carries the skill (copying into the harness's own folder is a FAIL). Setup gotchas baked into qa_matrix_lib.py (PI_CORE_HARNESS_KIND, PI_CORE_HAIKU_MODEL): the Pi harness kind enum is "pi_core" (bare "pi" 500s), and pi_core rejects a bare "haiku" model id (needs "claude-haiku-4-5"); codex accepts its curated short alias ("gpt-5.6-luna") bare. Both legs need sandbox=daytona + a vault key (codex: OpenAI; pi_core: the same Anthropic key matrix_w1_daytona.py documents) and SKIP with the exact reason when the credential is missing or ambiguous. --only <leg> runs a single leg without re-spending trial budget on the other. Neither leg has yet scored a clean 4/4 live, and both failure modes are real, reproducible model mechanics misses, not noise or infra flake — treat this cell's discovery rate as a genuine open quality question, not a settled pass:

  • pi_core: 2/3 (2026-08-06). Trial 2's model ran cp -r agent-files/gstack-autoplan .agenta-imports/ (copying the whole directory) then referenced a marker path that didn't match where the file landed; the engine correctly denied it fail-closed (approved-content resolution failed ...: gstack-autoplan/SKILL.md does not exist under .agenta-imports/.; deny). Not a product bug — the deny is doing its job — but evidence the model fumbles the exact copy-then-reference mechanics some of the time.
  • codex: 2/3 (2026-08-06, re-verified after stocking a clean OpenAI vault key — the earlier SKIP was purely the missing/ambiguous credential, now resolved). Trial 1 didn't attempt the mechanism at all: zero gates approved, the model just replied "I can't add skills by simply placing files in the skills folder; skills must be enabled through the agent configuration" (session 4fa17164-3ada-4ef6-86b5-63bf1c64f10b) — it named the right concept but never called read_config/commit_revision to act on it. Trials 2 and 3 passed cleanly (sessions 4c6a758b-39a3-4789-890e-06f3d68196b6, bf8a1283-667c-45c7-ab0d-b112e12106db).

  Worth a call: whether the guidance text needs to be more directive (e.g. explicitly say "copy the FILE, not the directory" and "always attempt the tool calls, don't just describe the mechanism"), or whether ~2/3 is an acceptable bar for this feature's launch.

Builtin capability cells (matrix_b*.py) — does the harness's own tooling still work

• resources/matrix_b1_builtin_find.py — [coached, harness-mechanism test] one native file-search call per harness (write three known marker files, then ask the model to locate them via its own search capability — never a manual directory listing), asserting the exact filenames come back in the TOOL OUTPUT payload, never the reply. Exists because nothing else in the gate ever exercised a harness builtin: verify-runner's overnight diagnosis found Pi's find builtin dead 52/52 across two benchmark runs (it shells out to the vendored fd binary with a flag that only exists from fd 9 onward; the runner image ships fd 8.6.0) — a total capability loss that sat invisible with nothing calling it. This cell closes that discoverability gap for the class, not just this one instance. Open discrepancy, not yet reconciled: this cell's own pi_core leg PASSED twice, live, with real filenames back (2026-08-07, sessions dd9c51ef-92d0-4780-855e-da6f48e07d9f and 47f02ab1-61ec-4db8-a0d6-2d96e98b9188) — which does not match "52/52 failed". Either the break is conditional on a flag/option this cell's simple case never exercises, or something already changed; needs reconciling with verify-runner before Pi's find gets called either fixed or still broken. Codex SKIPs by design, not tested: its exec output doesn't land in the tool-output-available payload's .output field (the same quirk qa_product.py's j2_mount already names and skips codex for), so this cell's evidence extraction cannot see codex's real results — a codex-shaped extraction is a follow-up. Claude PASSED cleanly on the two-turn version (session 4081e9ee-11c1-4f12-8245-6c390f90e9d8). Needed two EXPLICIT turns (write, then search) — one combined instruction left claude stopping after the write step without attempting the search at all.

The lifecycle cells (matrix_l*.py) — cold ↔ warm, and what survives each transition

These four cover the session-lifecycle work: which config changes are applied to a RUNNING sandbox and which tear it down, and what happens to a pending approval, a client tool and the durable mount across each transition. They all assert the STORED turn ledger (POST /sessions/turns/query → one sandbox_id per turn) or the STORED interaction rows (POST /sessions/interactions/query), never the SSE echo — nothing about warm-versus-rebuilt ever reaches the stream. An empty ledger FAILS a cell; missing evidence is not evidence.

• resources/matrix_l1_lifecycle_routes.py — MANDATORY. [mechanism-blind] the routing matrix itself: for each kind of mid-conversation config change, assert the route the runner took. One sandbox id = applied in place, two = rebuilt. Blocks on six cases: no change must stay warm; an instructions edit, a permissions edit and a tool-catalog edit must escalate; and a same-connection model switch must stay warm on BOTH claude and pi_core. The pi_core model case (added 2026-08-29) is the standing trap for the wire-spelling bug class: the router once keyed its table on the bare "pi" literal while the wire carries "pi_core", every playground model switch silently rebuilt, and the claude-only case could not see it (#6364). This is the cell that would have caught the cold1 rot described below.
• resources/matrix_l2_approval_across_config_change.py — MANDATORY. [coached] the killer combination: an approval answered while a config change rides along in the SAME request. It is the regression test for the applied-state bug (the pool used to stamp the INCOMING fingerprint on the approval-resume path, so the next turn continued warm on an environment running something else). Asserts the gated commit lands, the approval row ends resolved/responded, and — the real tell — the config change is not swallowed: it takes effect on the FOLLOWING turn, via a rebuild, in both the instructions and the permissions variant.
• resources/matrix_l3_abandoned_approval.py — MANDATORY. [coached] the user sends a new message instead of answering the card. Asserts the gated tool does NOT run (an unanswered approval is not consent), the row is swept to cancelled rather than left pending, and the session still works. cancelled vs pending is the loud-vs-silent distinction: a pending row is a card sitting on the page that no process is waiting on.
• resources/matrix_l5_live_route_observed.py — MANDATORY. [mechanism-blind, with a control] the other half of L1: an instructions edit made mid-conversation must actually be OBSERVED by the harness, not merely written to disk. Runs the same configuration on a fresh cold session as a control, so a failure isolates the runner rather than blaming the model; when the control also fails it reports INCONCLUSIVE instead of a confident wrong verdict. It asserts the edit, never the route, so it stays meaningful if the facet is ever made live again. Failed 2026-08-06 (claude/local) and now passes — see the finding note below. Extended 2026-08-06 (overnight gate run) to all three harnesses in one invocation (--only <harness> for a single leg) — this MANDATORY blocker cell had only ever run on claude; codex and pi_core were a named gap. Verified PASS on all three the same night the harness matrix landed.
• resources/matrix_l4_client_tool_lifecycle.py — nice-to-have. [coached] the client-tool round trip, and the only cell that covers client tools at all. Asserts the browser's result reaches the model and the client_tool interaction is stored. It RECORDS rather than asserts the sandbox count, which is two today: a client-tool pause is deliberately not parkable ("warm-hold": RESERVED, not built, #5384), so every client-tool round trip currently costs a rebuild. If that number ever reads one, the warm hold landed and the docstring needs updating.
• resources/matrix_n1_session_context.py — MANDATORY. [journey, with two controls] the per-turn session facts on the path the PRODUCT uses. Renames a session between two turns and asks the agent for the name, asks the agent for its own display name, and posts a forged meta.session_context that the service must ignore. Every expected value carries a random token minted for the run and spoken nowhere in the conversation, so a transcript-derived answer cannot match; the second ask is the exact shape of #6661, because by then the FIRST name is in the transcript and the current one is only in the stored header. This is the one cell that asserts on model prose, and it does so because nothing else can: turnContext is a prompt string on the service-to-runner payload, the runner logs nothing, and it is deliberately kept out of request.messages and out of persisted input. Two controls keep a FAIL honest — an echo probe (a model that cannot repeat a literal token makes the cell report INCONCLUSIVE) and a read-back of the stored header after every rename. Mandatory (via path_triggers.py) when the SDK session-context module, the platform-prompt renderer, the agent handler, or the API's session-context resolver changes. The gate could not see this class at all before v0.115.3: #6661 shipped green because the API stamped the facts in its invoke prelude, which never runs for a playground turn, and no cell renamed a session mid-conversation or asserted on the facts.

Finding the lifecycle cells surfaced (2026-08-06, claude on local, reproduced 3×) — FIXED: the workspaceFiles live route rewrote the instruction file and advanced applied state, but the running harness never re-read it. A warm session kept obeying the instructions it started with while the pool reported the NEW fingerprint, so every later turn matched and continued warm and the user's edit had no effect until something else evicted the session. A cold session with the identical configuration obeyed it immediately, which is what isolated the runner. This was the failure desired-state.ts refuses to allow for the prompts facet ("refreshing them and claiming the model saw the change would be a lie") reappearing on the facet that WAS made live — and note the direction: before the live route existed, an instructions edit forced a rebuild and therefore took effect on the next turn, so it was a regression in what the user sees, not a speedup. matrix_l5_live_route_observed.py is the repro.

The fix withdrew the route: workspaceFiles now routes to rebuild-sandbox in the capability table, and refresh-workspace left LIVE_ACTION_KINDS so restoring the table alone fails closed. An instructions edit costs a sandbox again, which is what it cost before the optimisation. L1's instructions case therefore expects TWO sandbox ids, and L2's first variant expects two as well — if you are reading an old green from before 2026-08-06, those cells expected one. The intended next shape is refresh THEN reopen the session, which needs the reopen to build its session init from the incoming request first, and needs proving on L5 rather than asserting.

Why cold1 changed (read before trusting an old green): that tier used to force its eviction by editing instructions.agents_md, which the lifecycle work briefly made a LIVE route — the tier would have gone on passing while measuring warm reuse, and park's "one sandbox id is meaningful" argument rests on cold1 reporting two on the same deployment. It now moves harness.permissions (the harnessSession facet → reopen-session, deliberately not live) and ASSERTS two distinct sandbox ids. It stays there even though an instructions edit escalates again today: a forcing function should depend on a route that is escalated by POLICY, not by current capability. Any future forcing function needs the same check.

Known verification gap, recorded rather than pretended away: the cold-resume stale-approval-regate path (shouldRegateStaleApproval, acp-interactions.ts — a stored allow for a marker call whose frozen bytes no longer exist must raise a FRESH gate, not execute on stale content) has unit coverage through the real wiring (the F8 tests) but no live wire-level cell. A scripted client cannot force "gate pending → environment evicted → gate answered" without violating the message-history contract real clients honor (confirmed: inserting an intervening turn triggers approval-mismatch(history) eviction correctly, but the runner then silently drops the stale decision on resume rather than raising a new card or executing — itself worth a second look, separate from the original regate question). Do not write a new wire cell for this without a different approach (e.g. a runner-side hook) than a pure HTTP client.

A candidate approach, found while building the matrix_l* cells and not yet tried: a turn that raises an approval gate AND a client-tool pause together takes the mixed-gate-no-park branch in session-coordinator.ts (approvalToPark refuses when nonParkablePauseCount > 0), so the environment is destroyed with the approval still pending — "gate pending → environment evicted" without any intervening user turn and without touching the message history. Answering afterwards lands on a pool miss and takes the cold decision-map path, which is exactly the state shouldRegateStaleApproval guards. Worth a spike before concluding this needs a runner-side hook.

• resources/qa_longctx.py — optional long-context / Gmail / concurrent-session probes. Needs live Gmail and GitHub Composio connections in the target project; skip it otherwise.
• resources/seeds/ — representative green results.json files kept as regression-seed references.

The incident checks — born from the free-credits 401 of 2026-08-30

A free-credits user on cloud hit a 401 because a fresh Daytona sandbox's first model call raced the asynchronous substitution of its Daytona Secret: the provider got the raw dtn_secret_<id> placeholder. The product then blamed the user's own key, which was wrong. The same release fixed a family of warm-session over-evictions caused by drift between two identity views in the runner. These four checks make each layer's failure loud instead of silent. Run all four on every gate.

• resources/matrix_c5_first_call_race.py — [mechanical] the placeholder race, and whether it is reported honestly. Mints a new workflow so the sandbox is necessarily cold, sends one short message so the first model call lands as early as possible, and asserts the STORED turn row came back. PASSes when the turn succeeds or when the failure carries the runner's credential_delivery_failed code with its retry copy. FAILs when the run advises adding a key while the underlying refusal carries the placeholder signature (Received=dtn_/dtn_secret_) — the incident itself. The assertion is deliberately body-INDEPENDENT: only the litellm proxy echoes a placeholder, so on a direct provider (where BYO-key cloud users live) an echo test is blind, and F6 shipped a user-blaming 401 straight through the first version of this cell. A credential refusal on this cell's necessarily-fresh sandbox must never advise adding a key, echo or no echo; with PR #6408 the honest classification is credential_delivery_failed. Against a deployment predating #6408 that assertion fails by construction — pass --pre-6408 to report it as a SKIP naming the known gap instead of an unexplained failure. It also counts Received=dtn_ lines in the credits proxy and reports the count as diagnostic, never as a verdict. The proxy is never guessed by name across the box: it must be named with --proxy-container, or belong to the target stack's compose project (--compose-project, else derived from whichever container publishes the port in AGENTA_BASE). With no match it prints "no credits proxy in this deployment; count not applicable" and carries on. Reading a foreign project's proxy invents evidence about a deployment that was never under test, which is worse than reading none. A run that dies on an exhausted provider key SKIPs with "environment: provider key out of credit" rather than failing — but only when the stored error carries a credit or billing signature, and never when a placeholder refusal is present, because that combination is the incident itself.
• resources/sweep_disagree.py — [mechanism-level invariant; run AFTER a gate session] greps the runner log for [reconcile] shadow ... DISAGREE ..., the line logReconcileShadow writes when the coordinator's configFingerprint decision and the router's facet digests disagree. That drift is the over-eviction signature and it is invisible from the wire — the turn still succeeds, it just paid for a rebuild it did not need — so a log sweep is the only way to catch it. --since <iso-timestamp> is required; --container defaults to autodetecting the local stack's runner. Exits 0 PASS, 1 FAIL (printing the offending lines), 2 SKIP when the log is not reachable. Three line shapes are excluded as known SHADOW-COMPARATOR gaps (triage 2026-08-31, f7-disagree-triage.md): the coordinator is correct and pinned, only the shadow's model of it disagrees, and the comparator fixes are a post-release follow-up — without the exceptions the sweep fails on the runner's own expected behavior on every loaded window. They are never silent: each excluded line is printed with its shape and the triage marker, the excluded count is reported separately, each shape is anchored on both halves of the line so it cannot swallow a real disagreement, and any line matching no shape still FAILS. Delete a shape when its fix lands; --no-exceptions fails on every DISAGREE line and is how you prove one can go.
• resources/matrix_h1_bad_harness.py — [mechanical] a malformed harness must fail closed. Drives three unreadable harness blocks (a wrong-type value, an unknown string, a null kind) at both the commit API and the live invoke, and records WHICH boundary refused (commit_api, invoke_http, or runner_stream) rather than demanding a particular one — a refusal further out is better, not worse. The invariant is that some boundary refuses attributably and no turn ever runs on a defaulted harness. FAILs if a turn executes and stores output.
• resources/check_secrets_teardown.py — [mechanical] a Daytona Secret must not outlive its run. Inventories the Daytona organization's Secret NAMES (never values) before a short Daytona journey, forces the teardown with a config-change eviction, then asserts every agenta_* Secret the run created is gone within a bounded settle window. Needs a Daytona API key in the environment (DAYTONA_API_KEY or AGENTA_RUNNER_DAYTONA_API_KEY) and SKIPs with the exact reason without one. Run it alone: a concurrent Daytona run against the same organization looks the same as a leftover. The listing walks GET /secret/paginated by cursor to exhaustion — /secrets does not exist, plain /secret is deprecated and fails above 1500 secrets, and a page parameter is silently ignored, so anything less than real cursor pagination is noise against an organization this size. The settle loop polls GET /secret/{secretId} per created Secret rather than re-enumerating. test_check_secrets_teardown_pagination.py pins the walk. A journey that dies on an exhausted provider key never creates a Secret, so it SKIPs with "environment: provider key out of credit" instead of failing the teardown path it never exercised.
• qa_matrix_lib.out_of_credit(error_text, codes) — [shared classification; no cell of its own] the SKIP reason when a run failed ONLY because the provider key has no credit left, and None for everything else. An exhausted key is an environment condition: a cell that renders it as FAIL spends a reviewer's attention on a topped-up balance, and teaches the reader that this cell's FAIL is sometimes noise, which is how a real regression gets waved through later. Recognition is narrow in both directions — the starter_credits_* codes plus the runner's own credits copy and the provider's billing refusal, and deliberately NOT a bare 401, a rate limit, or the placeholder refusal. Wired into matrix_c5_first_call_race.py and check_secrets_teardown.py; test_out_of_credit_skip.py pins the boundary from both sides.

Contributing

Before committing any resource script, run the repo-pinned ruff (uv run --no-sync ruff format then uv run --no-sync ruff check from the repo root covers it) — not uvx, whose pulled version has different defaults and produces a false block. Unformatted resource files break the repo-wide format CI job.

When you add a cell, ask whether it is only meaningful for changes in one part of the tree. If it is, add the rule to resources/path_triggers.py in the same change. A cell whose subsystem can be rewritten without anyone remembering to run it is coverage on paper.

Release-night findings and the full evidence history are archived in docs/design/agent-workflows/projects/qa/ (STATUS.md, findings.md, matrix.md).