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git-pr-workflows-git-workflow

Orchestrate a comprehensive git workflow from code review through PR creation, leveraging specialized agents for quality assurance, testing, and deployment readiness. This workflow implements modern g

Quality

64%

Does it follow best practices?

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SecuritybySnyk

Critical

Do not install without reviewing

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tessl review fix ./.agents/skills/git-pr-workflows-git-workflow/SKILL.md
SKILL.md
Quality
Evals
Security
Critical

E004: Prompt injection detected in skill instructions.

What this means

Detected a prompt injection in the skill instructions. The skill contains hidden or deceptive instructions that fall outside its stated purpose and attempt to override the agent’s safety guidelines or intended behavior.

Why it was flagged

The skill is a generic git/PR workflow, but it hardcodes a specific third-party repository (BigSimmo/Communication) as the merge target and sets up auto-merge, which acts on the user's repositories in ways they may not expect. There is no clear malicious intent, so this is medium risk rather than critical.

Report incorrect finding
Medium

W013: Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions.

What this means

The skill prompts the agent to compromise the security or integrity of the user’s machine by modifying system-level services or configurations, such as obtaining elevated privileges, altering startup scripts, or changing system-wide settings.

Why it was flagged

The skill can enable auto-merge and merge PRs into the shared repository (operational repo automation changes), but no irreversible operational loss is evidenced, since the only rollback path is a non-destructive `git revert`, so the tier stays at low.

Low

W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).

What this means

The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.

Why it was flagged

The required pre-push step at SKILL.md:101 asks the agent to "ensure all review comments addressed," which means reading GitHub PR review comments that outside contributors can post on the repository without the agent selecting a specific item.

Repository

BigSimmo/Communication

Path

.agents/skills/git-pr-workflows-git-workflow/SKILL.md

Audited
Security analysis
Snyk

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If you maintain this skill, you can claim it as your own. Once claimed, you can manage eval scenarios, bundle related skills, attach documentation or rules, and ensure cross-agent compatibility.