Verify a merged PR landed by content without orphaned late commits, post its `Review record` comment on the merged PR, and plan cleanup only when explicitly requested. Use after a PR merges into main.
94%
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Adds up to 20 points to the overall score
Medium
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The skill prompts the agent to compromise the security or integrity of the user’s machine by modifying system-level services or configurations, such as obtaining elevated privileges, altering startup scripts, or changing system-wide settings.
The skill has available state-changing operations (`workflow:lifecycle --write-evidence`, and worktree removal, remote branch deletion, and `git branch -D` under an explicit cleanup request), but no explicit unrecoverable operational loss is established, so it fails gate 2 and stays at low.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
The required workflow reads GitHub PR state and merge metadata via `gh pr view` and inspects commits on the PR branch, including any late commits pushed after auto-merge was armed, and under the rule that any GitHub PR reading is medium this is treated as medium, even though the agent selects the PR by number and fork-authored commit text is plausibly outsider-authored.
BigSimmo/PsychSift
fada614
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