Authentication

Rule

Auth is powered by Better Auth with account-first design. Every new user creates an account on first visit. Use getSession(event) to authenticate custom routes; actions are auto-protected. Normal app HTML and React Router page-data responses are one impersonal, public-cacheable shell for every visitor. The client decides whether to render private UI or redirect to sign-in.

Auth Modes

Never use local@localhost as a fallback identity in app code (getRequestUserEmail() ?? "local@localhost", session?.email ?? "local@localhost", etc.). There is no dev auth shim. That pattern pools every unauthenticated request into one shared tenant and caused the 2026-04-29 credentials leak. When there is no session, throw or return 401 — never substitute a sentinel. Enforced by scripts/guard-no-localhost-fallback.mjs.

Remote MCP OAuth

Every app's /mcp endpoint is also a standard protected MCP resource. OAuth-capable hosts connect with the remote MCP URL only, receive a WWW-Authenticate challenge, discover /.well-known/oauth-protected-resource and /.well-known/oauth-authorization-server, dynamically register a public client, and complete authorization-code + PKCE at /mcp/oauth/authorize / /mcp/oauth/token. Access tokens are audience-bound to the exact MCP URL and carry user/org identity plus mcp:read, mcp:write, mcp:apps, and/or offline_access; advertising offline_access lets hosts such as ChatGPT retain refresh access. Refresh tokens are stored hashed and rotate. Keep ACCESS_TOKEN and pnpm exec agent-native connect for local stdio proxying and fallback clients. The CLI uses the OAuth-native URL-only entry for Claude Code/Claude Code CLI by default; use the Connect page or npx @agent-native/core@latest connect --token <token> when a client needs explicit bearer headers.

Local → Real Account Migration

Upgrading from local@localhost to a real account preserves SQL-backed workspace data. The built-in migration moves application_state, user-scoped settings, oauth_tokens, and any template table that uses owner_email.

Templates with legacy global settings can provide POST /api/local-migration for one-time re-homing during the upgrade flow.

Organizations

Organizations are framework-managed, not handled by Better Auth's organization plugin (which is intentionally NOT registered). Org data lives in the framework's own organizations, org_members, and org_invitations tables. Every app supports creating orgs, inviting members, and role-based access (owner/admin/member).

The active org flows automatically: session.orgId — resolved by getOrgContext from org_members plus the user's active-org-id setting (not from a Better Auth session field) — → AGENT_ORG_ID → SQL scoping (see security skill).

When an authenticated user has no org memberships, the framework auto-creates a default org (named after the user) the first time getOrgContext runs. This keeps org-scoped templates from showing a manual "create organization" step. The auto-create path skips users with pending invites or a matching allowed_domain org so they can join the intended team instead. Set AUTO_CREATE_DEFAULT_ORG=0 only for deployments that intentionally want manual org creation.

Stop And Confirm Before Creating Or Switching Organizations

Vault credentials are scoped per organization and are not shared between them. A second organization therefore orphans every key synced under the first, and the only symptom is a missing-credential error somewhere else entirely, naming the key rather than the org change that caused it.

So: do not create an organization, repoint anyone's active-org-id, or migrate a user/roster/identity list into a new organization on your own initiative. Stop, say plainly that it will orphan the existing organization's credentials, and get an explicit yes first — even when the user asked for something that seems to imply it ("use the real org user list", "align this to the Settings team view", "migrate my users").

The intended pattern is one organization per workspace, with every app sharing it. When a request needs real org members, add them to the existing organization; never provision a parallel one per app. createOrganization() logs a loud warning when it creates an additional org for an account that already belongs to one, and setActiveOrgId() logs one whenever it moves an account from one org to another, naming both orgs and the orphaned credentials. Treat either warning as a bug report against your own change, not as noise.

Write active-org-id only through setActiveOrgId(email, orgId, reason) from @agent-native/core (src/org/active-org.ts). Calling putUserSetting(email, "active-org-id", ...) directly is how a roster migration silently repointed 21 accounts with nothing in the logs; the helper exists so that cannot happen again.

Do not wrap normal app shells in <RequireActiveOrg> just to force setup. Use non-blocking org UI such as InvitationBanner, OrgSwitcher, and a /team route so users can accept invites, join domain-matched teams, or switch orgs without blocking the primary product experience. Place org UI inside the agent sidebar so the setup checklist, chat, and CLI stay usable during setup.

A2A Identity

Set A2A_SECRET (same value) on all apps that must verify each other's identity.

• Outbound A2A calls are signed with JWTs
• Inbound calls are verified cryptographically
• Without A2A_SECRET, A2A calls are unauthenticated (fine for local dev)

Cross-App SSO (Dispatch identity hub)

Each hosted *.agent-native.com app has its own user store, so "sign in once" is identity federation, not a shared cookie. Dispatch is the identity authority.

• Opt-in per app via one env var: set AGENT_NATIVE_IDENTITY_HUB_URL=https://dispatch.agent-native.com and the app shows a "Sign in with Agent-Native" option. Unset = zero behavior change — the whole path is dormant. Reversible at any time.
• Flow: app → GET <hub>/_agent-native/identity/authorize?app=&redirect_uri=&state= → user logs in at Dispatch → 302 back with a short-lived (≤5min) A2A_SECRET-signed identity JWT (sub/email/name/org_domain/scope:"identity"). Strict redirect_uri allowlist (*.agent-native.com + localhost). App verifies the token, JIT-links strictly by verified email (existing same-email user → reused unchanged; new email → created), then mints a normal local session.
• Invariant (do not break): identity rows are only ever added — never modified, renamed, or deleted. Enabling SSO logs users out, but they always log back into the same email-matched account with data intact. Email is the only thing that crosses the trust boundary; the app never trusts a user id, role, or org from the wire.
• Canary rollout: deploy with the env unset everywhere (no-op) → set it on one app (mail) only → verify (logout → SSO → Dispatch → back to the same pre-existing account, data intact, direct logins still work) → expand app-by-app → rollback = unset the env on that app's deploy (instant, no data change).

Full runbook + flow detail: Cross-App SSO doc.

Builder Browser Access

Apps can connect to Builder via the cli-auth flow and persist shared browser credentials in .env. Agents then use the built-in get-browser-connection tool to provision a real browser session via AI Services.

Protecting Custom Routes

Actions are auto-protected. Do not create custom /api/ routes for normal CRUD, data queries, or action-backed operations; use defineAction and the auto-mounted action endpoint instead. If a route-only concern forces a custom route:

import { getSession } from "@agent-native/core/server";

export default defineEventHandler(async (event) => {
  const session = await getSession(event);
  if (!session) throw createError({ statusCode: 401 });
  // ...
});

Never create unprotected routes that modify data.

Sign-In from a Public Page

For public pages (share links, embeds, marketing pages) that need anonymous viewers to sign in and return to where they were, navigate them through the framework's sign-in entry point — never roll your own:

const ret = window.location.pathname + window.location.search;
window.location.href =
  "/_agent-native/sign-in?return=" + encodeURIComponent(ret);

After successful sign-in (token / email-password / Google OAuth), the framework redirects to return. The path is validated as same-origin via the URL parser — open-redirect / header-injection inputs fall back to /.

Bookmarked private paths work through the client session gate: the shared shell hydrates, AppProviders redirects the signed-out visitor to the framework sign-in entrypoint with the current path as return, and successful sign-in sends them back.

Gating the App Shell (avoid the logged-out infinite spinner)

Normal app HTML and React Router page-data responses deliberately bypass the server session guard. They are rendered impersonally and cached as one shared, public, hard-cached-at-the-CDN shell; APIs, actions, and framework data routes remain server-protected. The client session gate is therefore the authoritative decision point for whether private app UI renders.

Never, on the SSR HTML/.data path: set private, no-store, or Vary: Cookie; call getSession or read cookies in the SSR route or the login HTML path; or embed tokens/secrets into the rendered HTML — a token-bearing page still returns the same anonymous shell and resolves access client-side. This has regressed repeatedly (agents "fixing" it back to per-user SSR); it is enforced by guard:ssr-cache-shell and ssr-handler.spec.ts (packages/core/src/server/ssr-handler.ts), and reverts will be rejected.

AppProviders applies RequireSession automatically on its private branch. It resolves the session on the client and redirects signed-out visitors to /_agent-native/sign-in?return=… before mounting the routed shell:

import { AppProviders } from "@agent-native/core/client/hooks";

<AppProviders queryClient={queryClient}>
  <AppLayout>
    <Outlet />
  </AppLayout>
</AppProviders>;

• Keep the layout/outlet and always-mounted effects (poll, automation trigger) inside AppProviders so they do not fire 401s before the gate resolves.
• Pass sessionBypass to AppProviders only for a private-looking surface that authenticates by another mechanism (for example, an embed iframe carrying its own scoped token).
• Pass isPublicPath for public/anonymous and SEO routes. That branch does not mount RequireSession and SSRs real content.
• Use RequireSession directly only when a nested subtree needs custom redirect={false} / signedOut behavior.

Related Skills

• security — Data scoping, SQL injection, secrets
• actions — Auto-protected by the auth guard
• Cross-App SSO doc — Dispatch identity hub, federation flow, canary runbook