Monitor a PR, fix feedback and CI failures until fully green for 30 min. Run with /babysit-pr <number>
65
80%
Does it follow best practices?
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Adds up to 20 points to the overall score
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Critical
Do not install without reviewing
Fix and improve this skill with Tessl
tessl review fix ./.agents/skills/babysit-pr/SKILL.mdSecurity
1 critical severity finding. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.
Detected high-risk code patterns in the skill content — including its prompts, tool definitions, and resources — such as data exfiltration, backdoors, remote code execution, credential theft, system compromise, supply chain attacks, and obfuscation techniques.
The skill deliberately instructs an autonomous agent to commit and push all non-gitignored local files (including other agents' work and potentially sensitive files), run a persistent self-rearming loop, and perform admin force-merges, which enables data exfiltration and unauthorized repository tampering.
Low
Low-risk findings.
1 low severity finding. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
This skill’s runtime workflow uses `gh api --paginate repos/{owner}/{repo}/pulls/$ARGUMENTS/comments` and `gh api .../pulls/$ARGUMENTS/reviews` to fetch PR comment/review bodies from other contributors (humans and bots) and then injects their free-text `.body` snippets into the agent’s LLM context for deciding what to fix/reply.
c1ee18b
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