Augment a Wren project with business context that DB schema cannot carry — enum value meanings, units (USD vs cents, ms vs sec), NULL semantics, magic sentinels (-1 = unknown), soft-delete default filters, business synonyms, time-grain / TZ conventions, cross-system identifiers, currency rules, canonical-table preferences, AND named aggregation metrics (ARR, churn, DAU, WAU, NRR) proposed as cubes. Runs in one of two modes selected at session start: `grill` (one question at a time, user-driven) or `auto-pilot` (agent infers and applies, escalates only on conflicts and high-blast-radius additions like new cubes / views / relationships). Reads everything under <project>/raw/ (PDFs, glossaries, handbooks, code, data dictionaries) and optionally samples low-cardinality columns from the live DB (grill mode), compares against the current MDL / cubes / knowledge (rules + NL→SQL pairs), then fills gaps via the ten-category gap catalog and the cube proposal flow. Confirmed findings are written back to the right sink. Use when: user says 'enrich context', 'augment my project', 'grill me on this project', 'auto-fill my context', 'agent doesn't understand our docs / enum values / units / null meanings', 'business context is missing', 'what does status=A mean', 'is this amount in USD or cents', 'we keep getting wrong aggregations', 'add cubes for ARR / DAU / churn', 'we have a handbook / glossary / data dictionary the agent should know'; or after generating an MDL and noticing the agent lacks business semantics.
Security
1 high severity finding. You should review these findings carefully before considering using this skill.
The skill handles credentials insecurely by requiring the agent to include secret values verbatim in its generated output. This exposes credentials in the agent’s context and conversation history, creating a risk of data exfiltration.
The skill explicitly instructs the agent to read every file under raw/ (which may be sensitive) and to "quote the raw file + a short excerpt" when surfacing Lane 2 gaps, which forces the LLM to potentially include secret values verbatim in its outputs.
Low
Low-risk findings.
1 low severity finding. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
High likelihood: the required runtime workflow reads arbitrary free-form text from the project’s `raw/` folder (“Read everything… Read every file under `raw/`”), which is outsider-authored relative to the operating user, and then uses the extracted text as input context for gap classification/inference in the LLM.
7830cc7
If you maintain this skill, you can claim it as your own. Once claimed, you can manage eval scenarios, bundle related skills, attach documentation or rules, and ensure cross-agent compatibility.