云攻击:元数据API,S3/K8s,AWS/Azure/GCP身份提权,MinIO矩阵,阿里云FC,ChengZi SDK解密。Use when attacking cloud metadata, IAM, K8s, MinIO, Aliyun FC, or cloud post-ex.
72
90%
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Critical
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Security
3 findings: 1 critical severity, 1 high severity, 1 medium severity. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.
Detected high-risk code patterns in the skill content — including its prompts, tool definitions, and resources — such as data exfiltration, backdoors, remote code execution, credential theft, system compromise, supply chain attacks, and obfuscation techniques.
This document is an explicit offensive/cloud-attack playbook describing token/credential theft, metadata abuse, remote code execution, service enumeration, and techniques to exfiltrate data and deploy backdoors—highly malicious intent.
The skill handles credentials insecurely by requiring the agent to include secret values verbatim in its generated output. This exposes credentials in the agent’s context and conversation history, creating a risk of data exfiltration.
The skill includes explicit examples of credentials and instructs sending/reading tokens (e.g., POST bodies with accessKey/secretKey and metadata endpoints that return tokens), which requires the LLM to handle or reproduce secret values verbatim.
The skill prompts the agent to compromise the security or integrity of the user’s machine by modifying system-level services or configurations, such as obtaining elevated privileges, altering startup scripts, or changing system-wide settings.
The prompt explicitly describes techniques to access local cloud metadata endpoints, steal tokens, exploit kubelet/etcd and privileged pod host-escape paths and other privilege-escalation methods that would enable an agent to obtain credentials and compromise the machine or its cloud identity.
Low
Low-risk findings.
1 low severity finding. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
该技能在 SKILL.md 中包含对多种“云攻击手法”的描述(如 AWS/MinIO/FC 等枚举与利用路径),其中的 HTTP body/接口参数与“应返回环境变量/secret key”等文本会被作为该技能说明的可读内容导入运行时上下文;由于这些内容本质上是第三方知识/攻击流程文本而非操作用户自著,因此属于“公共/非用户自述的自由文本”通过文档到 LLM 上下文的风险。
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