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ce-compound

Document a recently solved problem as a durable repo learning, or capture project vocabulary in CONCEPTS.md. Use when capturing a learning after work.

63

Quality

76%

Does it follow best practices?

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SecuritybySnyk

Critical

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tessl review fix ./skills/ce-compound/SKILL.md
SKILL.md
Quality
Evals
Security

Security

1 critical severity finding. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.

Critical

E006: Malicious code pattern detected in skill scripts.

What this means

Detected high-risk code patterns in the skill content — including its prompts, tool definitions, and resources — such as data exfiltration, backdoors, remote code execution, credential theft, system compromise, supply chain attacks, and obfuscation techniques.

Why it was flagged

This skill bundle intentionally discovers and reads local agent session files (user home session stores), extracts user/assistant text and tool inputs (paths, commands, prompts), and instructs embedding those contents into subagent prompts/artifacts — a deliberate data-collection flow that creates a high risk of sensitive-data exposure or exfiltration if forwarded outside the host.

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Low

Low-risk findings.

1 low severity finding. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.

Low

W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).

What this means

The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.

Why it was flagged

High likelihood: in Full mode the orchestrator runs the bundled `scripts/session-history/` extraction pipeline, which reads pre-existing outsider-authored conversational text from session JSONL files under `~/.claude/projects/`, `~/.codex/sessions/`, `~/.cursor/projects/`, and `~/.pi/agent/sessions/`, then passes the extracted prose/summaries into the session-historian synthesis subagent prompt and into the LLM context.

Repository
EveryInc/compound-engineering-plugin
Audited
Security analysis
Snyk

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