Troubleshoot database/infra errors, compose commands/scripts, write runbook tutorials, capacity planning for DBA, SysOps, DevOps. Covers PostgreSQL, MongoDB, MySQL, ClickHouse, Apache Kafka, RabbitMQ, Linux log management, cron, logrotate. Uses MCP connectors (context7, deepwiki, ClickHouse Docs) for up-to-date official docs. Command and Script output is caveman-compressed (telegraphic prose, byte-exact code); Tutorial and Plan stay full prose. Trigger whenever the user mentions DBA, SysOps, DevOps, or infrastructure — error diagnosis, shell commands/scripts, cron expressions, log rotation, capacity estimation, migration planning, access/auth troubleshooting, or any operational database/infrastructure task. Also trigger on pasted database errors, stack traces, or log snippets. Trigger phrases: "compose a tutorial", "write a runbook", "fix this cron", "how to restore/enable", "compose a command/script", topic sizing, retention, partitions, replication, cluster planning.
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Does it follow best practices?
Impact
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No eval scenarios have been run
Advisory
Suggest reviewing before use
Security
2 findings — 2 medium severity. This skill can be installed but you should review these findings before use.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Third-party content exposure detected (medium risk: 0.65). The skill’s required MCP-first workflow routes to connectors like **deepwiki**/**context7** and explicitly ingests connector-returned text as untrusted reference data into the agent’s LLM context (e.g., via `ask_question` / `query-docs`), which can include **outsider-authored free text from public GitHub repositories** (issues/wiki/README content) at runtime.
The skill prompts the agent to compromise the security or integrity of the user’s machine by modifying system-level services or configurations, such as obtaining elevated privileges, altering startup scripts, or changing system-wide settings.
Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions detected (high risk: 0.70). The runbook explicitly instructs the agent to generate hardcoded commands and scripts (Command/Script and Check modes), uses privileged examples like "sudo" and systemctl, and encourages producing executable system-level commands (including crontab/system utilities), which risks causing privileged or state-changing operations on the host.
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