Content
88%Weight 40%Scale 1-5Reviews the quality of instructions and guidance provided to agents. Good implementation is clear, handles edge cases, and produces reliable results.
The body is a dense, executable reference for a large CLI: every command has copy-paste-ready invocations, destructive flows carry explicit validation checkpoints (dry-run, address verification, fingerprint comparison, confirm-before-live-run), and a full error-to-fix table provides recovery loops. Conceptual rationale is correctly offloaded to a single clearly signaled one-level-deep reference; only minor duplication and Agent Intent internals inlined in the main file keep it from full marks.
| Dimension | Reasoning | Score |
|---|---|---|
Conciseness | The body is dense and tool-specific — tables (intent map, command/sandbox/TTY matrix, error table) and full command lines with no concept tutorials, and the 'why' is properly offloaded ('for _why_ a command behaves the way it does ... read references/business-logic.md'). Minor duplication keeps it below 5: WALLET_PASS provisioning guidance is stated three times (the ‡ table footnote, the 'Always provision with a password' callout, and the Non-TTY section) and sandbox-bypass rules appear in both the top callout and the commands table. It is clearly above anchor 3 — the repetition is safety-critical reinforcement rather than unnecessary explanation. | 4 / 5 |
Actionability | Every command ships as an executable invocation with concrete flags and values — e.g. 'wallet-cli send bitcoin-native-1 --to bc1q... --amount 0.001 BTC --fee-per-byte 15 --rbf', the WETH wrap/unwrap example with exact selectors and left-padded hex ('--data 0x2e1a7d4d0000...06f05b59d3b20000'), 'WALLET_PASS=$(security find-generic-password -a default -s ledger-wallet-cli -w) wallet-cli ring encrypt …', and an error table mapping exact error strings to fixes. Copy-paste ready across the common cases. | 5 / 5 |
Workflow Clarity | Multi-step flows are explicitly sequenced with validation checkpoints: 'swap quote -> swap execute -> swap status', 'Always run with --dry-run first to validate calldata before signing', the receive-address mismatch escalation ('do not share or use the address ... run genuine-check before retrying'), the Solana two-phase withdraw ('run once to undelegate ... then re-run with --finalize'), and 'confirm with the user before the live run' for the irreversible first vault deposit. The error table plus 'don't retry blindly / check the frontend before re-running' gives explicit feedback loops, so the destructive-operation cap does not apply. | 5 / 5 |
Progressive Disclosure | One clearly signaled, one-level-deep reference exists in the bundle and is linked at the top ('Concepts & rationale: ... read references/business-logic.md') and again with a section pointer ('§ Receive-address verification'), and internal structure is strong (intent map, command matrix, error table). However, the 528-line body inlines deep internals that could be split out — the ~140-line Agent Intent trustchain/recovery/duplicate-protection semantics and the ring password-injection details — so it sits at anchor 4 ('most content is appropriately placed; minor organization gaps') rather than 5's 'content appropriately split'. | 4 / 5 |
Total | 18 / 20 Passed |