Gmail, Calendar, Drive, Docs, Sheets via gws CLI or Python.
52
58%
Does it follow best practices?
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High
Do not use without reviewing
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tessl review fix ./skills/productivity/google-workspace/SKILL.mdSecurity
1 high severity finding. You should review these findings carefully before considering using this skill.
The skill handles credentials insecurely by requiring the agent to include secret values verbatim in its generated output. This exposes credentials in the agent’s context and conversation history, creating a risk of data exfiltration.
The skill explicitly instructs the agent to accept raw client ID/client secret values (or an auth code/redirect URL) and write them into a JSON file or include them verbatim in commands, which requires the LLM to handle and output secrets directly (high exfiltration risk).
Low
Low-risk findings.
1 low severity finding. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Yes—outsider-authored free text is the contents of the user’s Gmail messages/docs/calendars (e.g., decoded email body text and Docs paragraph text) that this workflow fetches via the Google API/gws at runtime and emits into JSON output fields (e.g., `body`) which the agent can then pass into its LLM context.
d0d116b
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