Karpathy's LLM Wiki: build/query interlinked markdown KB.
50
56%
Does it follow best practices?
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Critical
Do not install without reviewing
Fix and improve this skill with Tessl
tessl review fix ./skills/research/llm-wiki/SKILL.mdSecurity
3 findings: 1 critical severity, 1 high severity, 1 medium severity. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.
Detected a suspicious URL in the skill instructions that could lead the agent to download and execute malicious scripts or binaries. This includes links to executables from untrusted sources, typosquatting of official packages, URL shorteners that obscure the destination, and personal file hosting services.
The GitHub repository (atomicmemory/llm-wiki-compiler) is from an unknown maintainer and references a CLI tool that could distribute executable code, which is a higher-risk download source; the Karpathy gist and example.com reference are benign documentation/placeholders.
The skill handles credentials insecurely by requiring the agent to include secret values verbatim in its generated output. This exposes credentials in the agent’s context and conversation history, creating a risk of data exfiltration.
The skill includes a CLI example that passes a user's password on the command line (ob login --email <email> --password '<password>'), which would require the agent to handle and potentially emit secret credentials verbatim.
The skill prompts the agent to compromise the security or integrity of the user’s machine by modifying system-level services or configurations, such as obtaining elevated privileges, altering startup scripts, or changing system-wide settings.
The skill explicitly instructs privileged system actions—creating/enabling a systemd service for background sync and running "sudo loginctl enable-linger $USER"—which modify system state and require elevated privileges.
Low
Low-risk findings.
1 low severity finding. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
The skill can ingest outsider-authored free text or documents the user supplies (URLs/files/pasted text) via “Ingest” (web_extract/save into raw/ and then summarize/update wiki pages), so prompt-injection content can enter the LLM at runtime through the ingest source.
6680afb
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