Gini's self-knowledge: how Gini configures, extends, and operates on its own state via /api/* and registered tools. Load when the user asks Gini about its own capabilities or asks Gini to modify its own configuration.
66
81%
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High
Do not use without reviewing
Security
1 high severity finding. You should review these findings carefully before considering using this skill.
The skill handles credentials insecurely by requiring the agent to include secret values verbatim in its generated output. This exposes credentials in the agent’s context and conversation history, creating a risk of data exfiltration.
The skill explicitly tells the agent to ask for API keys/tokens and then embed them verbatim in API/tool calls (e.g. set_provider apiKey, POST /api/messaging botToken, connectors token), which forces the LLM to handle secret values directly and creates an exfiltration risk.
Low
Low-risk findings.
1 low severity finding. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
At runtime, the workflow ingests outsider-authored free text from Telegram via the messaging bridge’s long-polling `getUpdates` and corresponding `/api/messaging/<id>/{receive,messages}` surfaces (i.e., user DMs/posted messages become LLM-visible input).
6c5d85e
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