Start, inspect, and drive the PostHog dev stack. Use for /run and /verify on this repo — when asked to launch PostHog, check whether the stack is healthy, inspect a running process, or verify a UI change against the live app.
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Critical
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Security
3 findings: 1 critical severity, 1 high severity, 1 medium severity. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.
Detected a suspicious URL in the skill instructions that could lead the agent to download and execute malicious scripts or binaries. This includes links to executables from untrusted sources, typosquatting of official packages, URL shorteners that obscure the destination, and personal file hosting services.
The localhost URLs are normal dev endpoints, but https://downloads.flox.dev/by-env/stable/install.sh is suspicious because it is a direct shell script download (used in a curl | sudo bash pattern) from a third-party domain — a high-risk distribution vector for malware.
The skill handles credentials insecurely by requiring the agent to include secret values verbatim in its generated output. This exposes credentials in the agent’s context and conversation history, creating a risk of data exfiltration.
The skill instructs the agent to obtain a personal_api_key (and shows a fixed test password) and to include that API key verbatim in Authorization headers for API calls, which requires the LLM to handle/output secret values directly.
The skill prompts the agent to compromise the security or integrity of the user’s machine by modifying system-level services or configurations, such as obtaining elevated privileges, altering startup scripts, or changing system-wide settings.
The skill explicitly instructs running a privileged install via "curl ... | sudo bash" and contains destructive system-state commands (hogli dev:reset wiping Docker volumes, rm bin/start.lock), which request sudo or modify machine state.
Low
Low-risk findings.
1 low severity finding. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
The skill's prerequisites include an explicit runtime setup command that fetches and pipes a remote install script into a shell (curl -L https://downloads.flox.dev/by-env/stable/install.sh | sudo bash), which executes external code and is required for the skill's toolchain.
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