AATMF T9 — Multimodal & Cross-Channel. Image steganography → text exec, audio prompt injection, video frame inject, document-with-hidden-text.
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Critical
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tessl review fix ./packages/decepticon/decepticon/skills/plugins/llm-redteam/t09-multimodal/SKILL.mdSecurity
1 critical severity finding. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.
Detected high-risk code patterns in the skill content — including its prompts, tool definitions, and resources — such as data exfiltration, backdoors, remote code execution, credential theft, system compromise, supply chain attacks, and obfuscation techniques.
This document explicitly describes and demonstrates active multimodal attack techniques (image/audio/video steganography, adversarial examples, and cross-modal chains that fetch attacker-controlled URLs) that enable prompt injection, data exfiltration, and remote instruction execution against LLMs.
Low
Low-risk findings.
1 low severity finding. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
SKILL.md:31-37 describes the workflow’s required handling of outsider-authored documents (PDF/DOCX) that may contain hidden/free text (e.g., hidden font/comments/metadata) which would be OCR/parsed into the LLM context as readable text at runtime.
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