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adversary-emulation

Threat-informed adversary emulation — pick a real APT, load its profile, and reproduce its TTPs within RoE scope to test detection & response. Index of available actor profiles + the emulation methodology.

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Adversary Emulation — index & methodology

Adversary emulation reproduces a specific, named threat actor's tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) — drawn from real, attributed intelligence — to test whether the target's people, process, and tooling detect and respond the way they should. It is distinct from generic penetration testing (opportunistic) and from simulation (abstract/random): emulation is threat-informed — every action traces to something a real group has been documented doing, mapped to MITRE ATT&CK.

Authorized use only. Emulate an actor's TTPs only within the engagement's Rules of Engagement and approved scope. Destructive techniques (Impact tactic: ransomware, wipers, ICS manipulation) are emulated as non-destructive proofs (e.g., a benign canary file, a dry-run) unless the RoE explicitly authorizes otherwise. The goal is to measure detection, not to cause damage.

When to use this

  • The operator (or roe.json threat profile) names a specific actor to emulate, or names a sector/region whose dominant threat is a known group.
  • A purple-team / ATT&CK-evaluation engagement: run an actor's TTP chain while the blue cell measures detection (see kill-chain-analysis and the blue_cell).
  • You want a realistic, defensible attack plan instead of an ad-hoc one.

Methodology (5 steps)

  1. Select the actor. Map the engagement's industry/region/crown-jewels to a relevant group (see the catalog below). When unsure, ask the operator via ask_user_question. Record the choice in the OPPLAN.
  2. Load the profile. load_skill <slug> (e.g. load_skill apt29-cozy-bear). Each profile carries attribution, targeting, dated campaigns, the actor's TTPs mapped to ATT&CK technique IDs, signature tooling, emulation guidance (how to reproduce each TTP with Decepticon's own tools), and detection notes.
  3. Scope to RoE. Intersect the actor's TTPs with the approved scope. Drop or down-scope anything out of bounds (e.g., replace a real wiper with a canary). Forbidden-destination / out-of-scope checks still apply at tool-call time.
  4. Emulate in kill-chain order. Walk Initial Access → Execution → Persistence → Priv-Esc → Defense Evasion → Credential Access → Discovery → Lateral Movement → Collection → C2 → Exfiltration → (proof-of) Impact, using only the techniques this actor is known for. Cite the ATT&CK ID in each finding.
  5. Measure & report. Record which actions the blue cell detected/blocked vs. missed (kill-chain-analysis, MTTD), and produce a threat-informed report that ties each result to the emulated actor + ATT&CK technique. Feeds the final report.

This complements soundwave/threat-profile (which picks the actor at planning time) and kill-chain-analysis (which scores detection across the chain).

Actor catalog

Profile (load_skill <slug>)AliasesAttributionMotivationNotable for
apt29-cozy-bearMidnight Blizzard, NOBELIUM, The DukesRussia (SVR)EspionageStealthy cloud/identity intrusions; SolarWinds supply chain
apt28-fancy-bearForest Blizzard, Sofacy, STRONTIUMRussia (GRU)Espionage / influenceCredential phishing, election & defense targeting
apt33-elfinPeach Sandstorm, HOLMIUMIranEspionage (destructive links)Aerospace & energy, Gulf-region targeting
apt34-oilrigHelix Kitten, Hazel SandstormIranEspionageDNS-tunneling C2, Middle-East supply-chain access
apt41-double-dragonWicked Panda, BARIUMChinaEspionage and financialSoftware supply-chain compromise; dual-use ops
lazarus-groupHidden Cobra, Diamond SleetNorth KoreaFinancial + destructiveBank/crypto heists, WannaCry, supply chain
fin7-carbanakCarbon Spider, Sangria TempestFinancially motivatedFinancialPOS/retail intrusions, Carbanak, ransomware affiliate
sandworm-teamVoodoo Bear, Seashell BlizzardRussia (GRU)Destructive / disruptiveNotPetya, Ukraine power-grid attacks, ICS
volt-typhoonVanguard Panda, Insidious TaurusChinaPre-positioningLiving-off-the-land in US critical infrastructure
scattered-spiderUNC3944, Octo Tempest, Muddled LibraFinancially motivatedFinancial / extortionHelp-desk social engineering, SIM-swap, MFA fatigue
salt-typhoonEarth Estries, GhostEmperor, FamousSparrowChinaEspionage / pre-positioningEdge-device exploitation, telecom targeting, DEMODEX rootkit
turlaVenomous Bear, Secret Blizzard, KRYPTONRussia (FSB)EspionageSnake rootkit, satellite C2, hijacking other APTs' infra
muddywaterMercury, Mango Sandstorm, Static KittenIran (MOIS)EspionagePowerShell RATs, RMM tool abuse, Middle-East targeting
apt36-transparent-tribeTransparent Tribe, Mythic Leopard, ProjectMPakistanEspionageCrimsonRAT, Android mobile malware, India-focused targeting
apt37-reaperScarCruft, Ricochet Chollima, InkySquidNorth KoreaEspionage / surveillanceRoKRAT, zero-day browser exploits, defector surveillance
mustang-pandaBronze President, Stately Taurus, RedDeltaChinaEspionagePlugX/DLL side-loading, USB propagation, SE Asia targeting
dark-caracalLebanon (GDGS)Espionage / surveillanceBandook RAT, multi-platform (Win/Mac/Android/Linux)
patchworkDropping Elephant, Chinastrats, HangoverIndiaEspionageBADNEWS RAT, copy-paste tradecraft, South Asia targeting
pink-sandstormAgrius, DEV-0227IranDestructive / espionageApostle wiper, destructive ops disguised as ransomware
apt10-stone-pandaStone Panda, MenuPass, Red ApolloChina (MSS)Espionage / IP theftCloud Hopper supply-chain, MSP targeting
kimsukyVelvet Chollima, Emerald Sleet, THALLIUMNorth Korea (RGB)EspionageBabyShark, credential phishing of think tanks/academia
sidewinderRattlesnake, T-APT-04, Razor TigerIndiaEspionageLNK chains, .NET implants, Pakistan military targeting

Profiles are grounded in MITRE ATT&CK group pages + public advisories; each lists its sources. ATT&CK technique IDs are the source of truth — verify against https://attack.mitre.org/groups/ if intel looks stale.

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