Enumerate AWS IAM policies, detect privilege escalation paths per Rhino Security Labs canonical 21 primitives.
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Critical
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tessl review fix ./packages/decepticon/decepticon/skills/standard/cloud/aws-iam-enum/SKILL.mdSecurity
1 critical severity finding. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.
Detected high-risk code patterns in the skill content — including its prompts, tool definitions, and resources — such as data exfiltration, backdoors, remote code execution, credential theft, system compromise, supply chain attacks, and obfuscation techniques.
This document provides explicit, actionable AWS IAM enumeration and privilege-escalation techniques (including CreateAccessKey, iam:PassRole + lambda:CreateFunction to deploy malicious Lambdas, and other primitives) clearly intended to enable account takeover.
Low
Low-risk findings.
1 low severity finding. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
The workflow runs AWS CLI commands that write policy data to /tmp/policy.json and then passes the file’s contents into `iam_policy_audit(open("/tmp/policy.json").read())`, which is runtime-readable free text originating from the AWS account’s IAM policies and (critically) is not operator-authored.
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