Non-traditional C2 channels — Discord/Telegram bots, DNS-over-HTTPS, blockchain-based C2, email-based C2, and cloud function dead drops for covert command and control.
62
73%
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Critical
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tessl review fix ./packages/decepticon/decepticon/skills/standard/post-exploit/c2-alternative-channels/SKILL.mdSecurity
4 findings: 2 critical severity, 1 high severity, 1 medium severity. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.
Detected a suspicious URL in the skill instructions that could lead the agent to download and execute malicious scripts or binaries. This includes links to executables from untrusted sources, typosquatting of official packages, URL shorteners that obscure the destination, and personal file hosting services.
Multiple URLs point to GitHub repositories that host command-and-control frameworks and tooling (including repos by obscure/leetspeak usernames) which are commonly used to distribute or enable malware, so the sources should be treated as high-risk.
Detected high-risk code patterns in the skill content — including its prompts, tool definitions, and resources — such as data exfiltration, backdoors, remote code execution, credential theft, system compromise, supply chain attacks, and obfuscation techniques.
This document is an explicit command-and-control (C2) manual describing multiple implant implementations that perform remote code execution, credential misuse, and covert data exfiltration—intended for malicious control of compromised hosts.
The skill handles credentials insecurely by requiring the agent to include secret values verbatim in its generated output. This exposes credentials in the agent’s context and conversation history, creating a risk of data exfiltration.
The skill embeds and instructs use of literal credentials (webhook URLs, bot tokens, API keys, email/passwords) directly in commands and code, which requires the LLM or operator to handle and output secret values verbatim, creating an exfiltration risk.
The skill prompts the agent to compromise the security or integrity of the user’s machine by modifying system-level services or configurations, such as obtaining elevated privileges, altering startup scripts, or changing system-wide settings.
The skill contains ready-to-run implant code that executes arbitrary shell commands (via subprocess/eval), uploads/exfiltrates files, and polls for remote operator commands — behaviors that directly enable compromising and changing the host system.
Low
Low-risk findings.
1 low severity finding. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
The skill includes code that at runtime polls and executes operator-supplied commands from external endpoints (e.g., https://discord.com/api/webhooks/<WEBHOOK_ID>/<WEBHOOK_TOKEN>, https://api.telegram.org/bot<BOT_TOKEN>/getUpdates, https://dns.google/resolve, https://mainnet.infura.io/v3/<API_KEY>), so these URLs directly control prompts/instructions and cause remote code execution.
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