Mythic C2 framework operations — multi-agent (Apfell, Apollo, Athena, Poseidon, Medusa), web UI on 7443, RabbitMQ + PostgreSQL backend, JSON-RPC tasking model, building an agent via mythic-cli, profile design (HTTP/SMB/named pipe/peer-to-peer), opsec defaults. Comparison to Sliver: more pluggable, less polished UI.
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Critical
Do not install without reviewing
Security
4 findings: 2 critical severity, 1 high severity, 1 medium severity. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.
Detected a suspicious URL in the skill instructions that could lead the agent to download and execute malicious scripts or binaries. This includes links to executables from untrusted sources, typosquatting of official packages, URL shorteners that obscure the destination, and personal file hosting services.
These URLs point to a command-and-control framework (Mythic), its agents and C2 profiles on GitHub, and an operator callback domain used to build and distribute executable payloads, which are high-risk sources for malware/C2 activity.
Detected high-risk code patterns in the skill content — including its prompts, tool definitions, and resources — such as data exfiltration, backdoors, remote code execution, credential theft, system compromise, supply chain attacks, and obfuscation techniques.
This document is an explicit operator guide for a command-and-control (C2) framework that instructs building remote-access payloads, executing remote commands, lateral movement, persistence, and OPSEC evasion — clearly intended for offensive/abusive use.
The skill handles credentials insecurely by requiring the agent to include secret values verbatim in its generated output. This exposes credentials in the agent’s context and conversation history, creating a risk of data exfiltration.
The Python example embeds a plaintext password (password="pw") in a login call, which requires any real credentials to be included verbatim in output and is therefore an insecure secret-handling pattern.
The skill prompts the agent to compromise the security or integrity of the user’s machine by modifying system-level services or configurations, such as obtaining elevated privileges, altering startup scripts, or changing system-wide settings.
The skill explicitly instructs running multiple sudo installation and service-management commands (install_docker, mythic-cli installs, payload builds), which modify system state and require elevated privileges, so it pushes the agent to perform privileged system changes.
Low
Low-risk findings.
1 low severity finding. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
The skill's setup/install commands fetch and install remote code that is then executed (git clone https://github.com/its-a-feature/Mythic and multiple mythic-cli install github https://github.com/... URLs for agents/profiles), so these external GitHub repositories are runtime dependencies that result in executing remote code.
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