FIN7 — Adversary Emulation Playbook

Tier-2 financially-motivated crew that evolved from point-of-sale theft to big-game-hunting ransomware (REvil / DarkSide / Black Basta links). Signature traits: revenue-selected targets, convincing business-themed spearphishing reinforced by phone calls, and mature EDR-evasion tooling (AvNeutralizer / AuKill). Authorized red-team emulation only.

When to emulate FIN7

• The client wants a realistic ransomware-precursor test: phishing resilience, EDR tamper-resistance, AD attack-path hardening, and backup/recovery readiness.
• Retail, hospitality, financial, software, medical, or other high-revenue targets (see the industry → actor map in ../../references/apt-groups.md).

ThreatProfile seed (plan/threat-profile.json)

{
  "engagement_name": "<fill>",
  "actor_name": "FIN7-like (Carbon Spider / Sangria Tempest)",
  "actor_aliases": ["Carbon Spider", "Sangria Tempest", "GOLD NIAGARA", "ELBRUS", "ITG14"],
  "group_id": "G0046",
  "tier": "tier-2",
  "sophistication": "high",
  "motivation": "financial",
  "initial_access": ["T1566.001", "T1566.002", "T1204.002"],
  "key_ttps": ["T1059.001", "T1547.001", "T1053.005", "T1562.001", "T1003.001", "T1558.003", "T1021.001", "T1486", "T1567.002"],
  "tools": ["Phishing kit + phone follow-up", "Sliver", "NetExec", "Impacket", "EDR-test/BYOVD (authorized)", "canary encryptor"],
  "infrastructure": ["Business-themed lure domains", "Sliver HTTPS C2", "Engagement-owned exfil bucket"],
  "recent_cti_delta": "Since 2020 shifted to big-game-hunting ransomware (REvil/DarkSide; Black Basta TTP overlap); AvNeutralizer/AuKill EDR-killer; targets shortlisted by revenue via Crunchbase/D&B/ZoomInfo, ransom sized to revenue.",
  "confidence": "probable"
}

Kill-chain emulation

CONOPS kill_chain (copy into conops.json)

1. recon — revenue-based target + staff selection (1).
2. initial-access — spearphish attachment + phone follow-up (2).
3. post-exploit — loader exec, EDR tamper, LSASS, AD recon/Kerberoast, lateral, DA via DCSync (3-9).
4. c2 — Sliver (within 3).
5. exfiltration — data theft + canary ransomware impact (10-11).

OPSEC & signature fidelity

• Phone-reinforced phishing is the fidelity-defining move — pair the email lure with a follow-up call (authorized) to mirror FIN7's hands-on approach.
• EDR evasion is the headline. The test is whether the EDR survives a BYOVD/tamper attempt; mirror AvNeutralizer's intent (disable endpoint telemetry) using an authorized test driver.
• Dwell days-to-weeks; double extortion (exfil before encrypt).

RoE / safety gates

• Phishing + phone pretext require explicit authorization + lure-deconfliction (/skills/standard/phisher/lure-deconfliction/SKILL.md); name in-scope staff.
• EDR tampering / BYOVD can destabilize endpoints — authorize it, run on a lab/canary host first, and confirm rollback. Add an EMERGENCY abort: "production endpoint protection disabled outside the authorized test host, or production data encrypted/exfiltrated."
• Ransomware impact is canary-only.

Deconfliction

• Record lure domains, the Sliver implant, EDR-tamper test host, and exfil destination in deconfliction.json + cleanup.json.
• Agree an EDR-tamper window with the SOC; the DA-path and ransomware-readiness findings are the deliverable, not a surprise outage.

Fidelity notes (deviations)

• No real Carbanak/AvNeutralizer binaries — emulate the loader chain with Sliver and the EDR-tamper with an authorized test, or simulate when no lab host is available.
• Impact is a canary marker proving DA + deploy capability; the deliverable distinguishes "ransomware-ready (canary proven)" from "production encryption" (never the latter).