imds-pivot
Pivot from SSRF or RCE to cloud Instance Metadata Service (IMDS) — extract IAM role creds, instance identity, user-data secrets.
59
70%
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Critical
Do not install without reviewing
Fix and improve this skill with Tessl
tessl review fix ./packages/decepticon/decepticon/skills/standard/cloud/imds-pivot/SKILL.mdSecurity
2 findings: 1 critical severity, 1 medium severity. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.
E006: Malicious code pattern detected in skill scripts.
What this means
Detected high-risk code patterns in the skill content — including its prompts, tool definitions, and resources — such as data exfiltration, backdoors, remote code execution, credential theft, system compromise, supply chain attacks, and obfuscation techniques.
Why it was flagged
This document is an explicit offensive playbook for abusing SSRF/RCE to access cloud instance metadata, steal service credentials/tokens, and pivot — high-risk malicious guidance for credential theft and data exfiltration.
W013: Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions.
What this means
The skill prompts the agent to compromise the security or integrity of the user’s machine by modifying system-level services or configurations, such as obtaining elevated privileges, altering startup scripts, or changing system-wide settings.
Why it was flagged
This skill explicitly instructs accessing instance metadata endpoints and extracting cloud credentials (writing them to /tmp, exporting them, and using them) and describes SSRF/IMDS bypass techniques — actions that enable active credential theft and remote pivoting from the host.
Low
Low-risk findings.
1 low severity finding. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
What this means
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Why it was flagged
The workflow is an SSRF/instance-metadata pivot that at runtime would fetch cloud metadata URLs (e.g., AWS/GCP/Azure 169.254.169.254 and metadata.google.internal) and the responses (IAM creds, user-data, access tokens) are arbitrary plain text originating from the target environment, which then becomes readable LLM context via whatever tool/agent execution captures and presents the fetched content.
- Repository
- PurpleAILAB/Decepticon
- Commit
e34afba
- Audited
- Security analysis
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