Deploy and drive Kali Linux tools via MCP-Kali-Server — structured tool-call interface, SSH tunnel setup, prompt-injection hygiene for AI-assisted engagements.
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Critical
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tessl review fix ./packages/decepticon/decepticon/skills/standard/decepticon/kali-mcp-bridge/SKILL.mdSecurity
3 findings: 2 critical severity, 1 medium severity. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.
Detected a suspicious URL in the skill instructions that could lead the agent to download and execute malicious scripts or binaries. This includes links to executables from untrusted sources, typosquatting of official packages, URL shorteners that obscure the destination, and personal file hosting services.
The GitHub clone URL points to a third‑party/unverified user repository (Wh0am123) that the skill instructs you to clone and execute locally, which is a common vector for malicious code; the remaining URLs are localhost/placeholder targets and not external download sources.
Detected high-risk code patterns in the skill content — including its prompts, tool definitions, and resources — such as data exfiltration, backdoors, remote code execution, credential theft, system compromise, supply chain attacks, and obfuscation techniques.
This playbook explicitly provisions remote code execution APIs, raw command execution, credential-cracking and exploit tooling, and operational stealth guidance while noting the server has no built-in authentication — indicating deliberate offensive/abusive capabilities that are high-risk if misused.
The skill prompts the agent to compromise the security or integrity of the user’s machine by modifying system-level services or configurations, such as obtaining elevated privileges, altering startup scripts, or changing system-wide settings.
The skill explicitly instructs using sudo to install system packages and later troubleshooting again suggests `sudo apt install <tool>`, and it exposes a raw `execute_command` endpoint that runs arbitrary bash on the Kali host — all of which allow the agent to modify system files and system state.
Low
Low-risk findings.
2 low severity findings. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
The required runtime path is that the AI agent calls Kali tools via the MCP/HTTP bridge, then ingests untrusted tool output as `output` inside the agent context; because tool output includes HTTP responses, banners, DNS TXT, and scan results, it can contain outsider-authored free text (e.g., responses from scanned targets) and thus indirect prompt injection.
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
The skill's deployment instructions fetch and run remote code from https://github.com/Wh0am123/MCP-Kali-Server.git (git clone ... then ./server.py), which executes external code during setup and thus can directly affect agent behavior.
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