Systematic Linux privilege-escalation enumeration methodology — ordered phases covering sudo, SUID/SGID, capabilities, cron, writable paths, NFS, kernel CVEs, and GTFOBins lookup, grounded in LLM-assisted autonomous privesc research (hackingBuddyGPT/ipa-lab).
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tessl review fix ./packages/decepticon/decepticon/skills/standard/post-exploit/linux-privesc-enum/SKILL.mdDetected high-risk code patterns in the skill content — including its prompts, tool definitions, and resources — such as data exfiltration, backdoors, remote code execution, credential theft, system compromise, supply chain attacks, and obfuscation techniques.
This document is an explicit offensive privilege-escalation guide providing step-by-step exploitation commands (sudo/SUID/LD_PRELOAD/cron/dirtypipe etc.), credential theft and persistence instructions, and guidance to fetch remote payloads—clearly intended to enable unauthorized access and backdoor installation.
The skill handles credentials insecurely by requiring the agent to include secret values verbatim in its generated output. This exposes credentials in the agent’s context and conversation history, creating a risk of data exfiltration.
This skill explicitly instructs the agent to locate and read environment variables, /etc/shadow, SSH private keys, packet captures, and other sensitive files/outputs, which requires handling and potentially outputting secret values verbatim (high exfiltration risk).
The skill prompts the agent to compromise the security or integrity of the user’s machine by modifying system-level services or configurations, such as obtaining elevated privileges, altering startup scripts, or changing system-wide settings.
This skill contains explicit, step-by-step instructions to escalate privileges and modify system state (e.g., overwrite /etc/passwd, edit /etc/sudoers, create SUID backdoors, install persistence), which directly compromise the host.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
The required workflow includes a GTFOBins lookup that fetches public web content at runtime (e.g., `GTFOBins lookup workflow` calling `https://gtfobins.github.io/...`), so outsider-authored free text from that page can be ingested into the agent’s LLM context for summarization/decision-making.
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
The skill contains a runtime command that curl-fetches and pipes a remote script to bash—executing code from https://<ATTACKER_IP>/linpeas.sh—so it fetches and runs external code during runtime.
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