Content
82%Weight 40%Scale 1-5Reviews the quality of instructions and guidance provided to agents. Good implementation is clear, handles edge cases, and produces reliable results.
A tight, operationally focused skill body: lean prose, concrete commands, a correctly placed verification step, and clean section organization. The gaps are execution details (DKIM key generation, placeholder resolution) and the absence of error-recovery guidance around the verification step.
Suggestions
Add a short fix-and-retry loop after 'Verify before sending': e.g. 'If SPF/DKIM alignment fails, re-check the selector/p= pubkey match and DNS propagation (dig +trace) before proceeding.'
Show how to generate the DKIM key pair (e.g. openssl genrsa / opendkim-genkey) so the 'p=<pubkey>' TXT record is executable rather than a placeholder.
State where <sandbox-ip> and the registrar/NS values come from (e.g. plan/phisher/infrastructure.md) so placeholders resolve without guesswork.
| Dimension | Reasoning | Score |
|---|---|---|
Conciseness | The body is lean and operational: no explanation of what DNS, SPF, or Punycode are; the two-sentence intro states only operational stakes ('modern inboxes drop the mail and browsers flag the page'), and every section delivers instructions or a concrete record/command block. Matches anchor 5 — it assumes Claude's competence and every token earns its place; it is above anchor 4 because there is nothing to trim. | 5 / 5 |
Actionability | Mostly executable guidance: the idna Punycode snippet, the acme.sh issue command, and the dig/swaks verification commands are copy-paste ready, and the DNS block gives exact record shapes. It falls short of anchor 5 because key details are placeholders with no generation steps — the DKIM record shows 'p=<pubkey>' without how to generate the key pair, and '<sandbox-ip>' / NS delegation are named but not commanded. | 4 / 5 |
Workflow Clarity | There is a clear sequence (choose name -> DNS -> TLS -> 'Verify before sending' -> Evidence -> Failsafe) with an explicit verification checkpoint using concrete commands. It is not anchor 5 because there is no error-recovery loop — the verify section never says what to do when SPF/DKIM/DMARC alignment fails — and not anchor 3 because the validation step is explicit, current, and placed correctly before sending. | 4 / 5 |
Progressive Disclosure | The body is well-organized into seven focused sections with no bundle files and no nested references, and external paths it does cite (plan/roe.json, plan/phisher/infrastructure.md) are one level and clearly signaled. It misses anchor 5 because at ~69 lines it exceeds the under-50-line simple-skill threshold and some detail (DKIM key generation, the lure-deconfliction handshake, the failsafe repoint procedure) naturally belongs in reference files. | 4 / 5 |
Total | 17 / 20 Passed |