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m365-mailbox-compromise

Microsoft 365 mailbox compromise chain — OAuth consent phishing, delegate access abuse, mail rule persistence, and token theft via device code phishing. Full kill chain from initial access to persistent email collection.

57

Quality

66%

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SecuritybySnyk

Critical

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tessl review fix ./packages/decepticon/decepticon/skills/standard/cloud/m365-mailbox-compromise/SKILL.md
SKILL.md
Quality
Evals
Security

Security

2 findings: 1 critical severity, 1 high severity. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.

Critical

E006: Malicious code pattern detected in skill scripts.

What this means

Detected high-risk code patterns in the skill content — including its prompts, tool definitions, and resources — such as data exfiltration, backdoors, remote code execution, credential theft, system compromise, supply chain attacks, and obfuscation techniques.

Why it was flagged

This document provides explicit, actionable instructions to compromise Microsoft 365 tenants (device-code and OAuth consent phishing), maintain persistent access (refresh tokens, delegate/impersonation, inbox/transport rules), and exfiltrate emails and attachments — demonstrating clear malicious intent and techniques for unauthorized data exfiltration and persistence.

Report incorrect finding
High

W007: Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.

What this means

The skill handles credentials insecurely by requiring the agent to include secret values verbatim in its generated output. This exposes credentials in the agent’s context and conversation history, creating a risk of data exfiltration.

Why it was flagged

The prompt instructs capturing, storing, and embedding OAuth tokens, client secrets, and refresh tokens verbatim into curl commands and headers, which requires the LLM to handle and output secret values directly.

Repository
PurpleAILAB/Decepticon
Audited
Security analysis
Snyk

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