macos-post-exploitation
macOS endpoint post-exploitation — launchd persistence, TCC bypass, Keychain credential access, dylib hijacking, Gatekeeper/quarantine evasion, and discovery on Apple hosts.
68
83%
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Critical
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E006: Malicious code pattern detected in skill scripts.
What this means
Detected high-risk code patterns in the skill content — including its prompts, tool definitions, and resources — such as data exfiltration, backdoors, remote code execution, credential theft, system compromise, supply chain attacks, and obfuscation techniques.
Why it was flagged
This document is a clear offensive post‑compromise playbook providing step‑by‑step techniques for persistence, credential theft, defense evasion, and C2/exfiltration, and therefore represents high-risk malicious intent.
W007: Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.
What this means
The skill handles credentials insecurely by requiring the agent to include secret values verbatim in its generated output. This exposes credentials in the agent’s context and conversation history, creating a risk of data exfiltration.
Why it was flagged
The prompt explicitly directs reading and exfiltration of Keychain items and plaintext credentials (e.g., `security find-generic-password -ga`, `security dump-keychain`, "exfil the *.keychain-db + the login password") which requires the agent to handle and potentially output secret values verbatim.
W013: Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions.
What this means
The skill prompts the agent to compromise the security or integrity of the user’s machine by modifying system-level services or configurations, such as obtaining elevated privileges, altering startup scripts, or changing system-wide settings.
Why it was flagged
The skill explicitly instructs actions that modify system state and require elevated privileges—e.g., reading/writing the system TCC DB, dropping LaunchDaemons into /Library, stripping quarantine/xattr and ad-hoc codesigning—thereby pushing the agent to compromise the host.
- Repository
- PurpleAILAB/Decepticon
- Commit
31e1c8e
- Audited
- Security analysis
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