NetExec (CrackMapExec successor) — unified SMB/LDAP/MSSQL/WinRM/RDP/SSH/FTP/VNC protocol auth + post-auth modules. 200+ modules incl. BloodHound auto-ingest, ESC1-15 scanning, PrintNightmare, LDAP relay.
70%
Does it follow best practices?
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Adds up to 20 points to the overall score
High
Do not use without reviewing
Fix and improve this skill with Tessl
tessl review fix ./packages/decepticon/decepticon/skills/standard/ad/netexec/SKILL.mdDetected sensitive credentials directly embedded within the skill content, such as API keys, access tokens, private keys, or service-specific secrets. Secrets should never be hardcoded in plain text within skill instructions.
The `<potential_matches>` section is empty, so I reviewed the skill content directly. - **Line 33** (`aad3b435b51404ee...:31d6cfe0d16ae931...`): Truncated with "...", so it is a placeholder under the truncation rule. The visible prefixes are also the well-known empty LM and NT hash constants, which are public and not credentials. - **Lines 32 and 88** (`-p Spring2024!`): This is a mixed-case, digit-and-symbol password used as a literal credential in a spray and auth command. Under the strict entropy rule it looks like a low-entropy example. Under the recall-first override, it is ambiguous and plausibly a real, reusable password, so I am flagging it. Confidence is low: it reads like a seasonal dictionary-style pattern, and the spray example is a standard pentest illustration. - **Other items** (`$PW`, `$DC`, `alice`, `administrator`): These are variables or usernames with no literal secret value. - No private key blocks, API tokens, or service keys are present. Net: no clearly high-entropy secret. The flag is a precautionary recall decision on the repeated literal password.
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