network-replay
PCAP-based network replay attacks: capture auth sequences, session tokens, and protocol frames, then replay or inject to achieve unauthorized access or session hijack.
57
66%
Does it follow best practices?
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Critical
Do not install without reviewing
Fix and improve this skill with Tessl
tessl review fix ./packages/decepticon/decepticon/skills/standard/post-exploit/network-replay/SKILL.mdSecurity
3 findings: 1 critical severity, 1 high severity, 1 medium severity. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.
E006: Malicious code pattern detected in skill scripts.
What this means
Detected high-risk code patterns in the skill content — including its prompts, tool definitions, and resources — such as data exfiltration, backdoors, remote code execution, credential theft, system compromise, supply chain attacks, and obfuscation techniques.
Why it was flagged
This document is a high-risk offensive playbook that provides step‑by‑step instructions for capturing network traffic, harvesting credentials/tokens, performing MITM/ARP poisoning, and replaying or injecting packets to gain unauthorized access.
W007: Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.
What this means
The skill handles credentials insecurely by requiring the agent to include secret values verbatim in its generated output. This exposes credentials in the agent’s context and conversation history, creating a risk of data exfiltration.
Why it was flagged
The playbook explicitly instructs extracting session cookies/JWTs from pcaps and pasting/embedding them verbatim into commands and code (e.g., token = "<paste_jwt>", COOKIE="session=<extracted_value>", curl -H "Authorization: Bearer $JWT"), which requires the LLM to handle secret values directly.
W013: Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions.
What this means
The skill prompts the agent to compromise the security or integrity of the user’s machine by modifying system-level services or configurations, such as obtaining elevated privileges, altering startup scripts, or changing system-wide settings.
Why it was flagged
The playbook explicitly instructs running sudo commands (tcpdump, arpspoof, tcpreplay, responder), modifying kernel settings via "echo 1 | sudo tee /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_forward", and performing ARP poisoning/raw packet injection — all actions that require elevated privileges and modify the machine or network state.
Low
Low-risk findings.
1 low severity finding. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).
What this means
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
Why it was flagged
This skill’s workflow requires the agent to operate on captured traffic/pcap and extract token/cookie/JWT contents using tools like tshark/curl (runtime reading of /tmp/*.pcap content and then constructing replay values), which is outsider-authored free text originating from other parties’ network traffic that the agent did not create.
- Repository
- PurpleAILAB/Decepticon
- Commit
e34afba
- Audited
- Security analysis
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