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orchestration

Decepticon orchestrator patterns — delegation, state management, adaptive re-planning, context handoff protocols.

60

Quality

71%

Does it follow best practices?

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SecuritybySnyk

Critical

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tessl review fix ./packages/decepticon/decepticon/skills/standard/decepticon/orchestration/SKILL.md
SKILL.md
Quality
Evals
Security

Security

2 findings: 1 critical severity, 1 high severity. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.

Critical

E006: Malicious code pattern detected in skill scripts.

What this means

Detected high-risk code patterns in the skill content — including its prompts, tool definitions, and resources — such as data exfiltration, backdoors, remote code execution, credential theft, system compromise, supply chain attacks, and obfuscation techniques.

Why it was flagged

This document is an explicit offensive operations orchestration playbook directing reconnaissance, exploitation, credential dumping/exfiltration, lateral movement and C2 — indicating intentional malicious activity.

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High

W007: Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.

What this means

The skill handles credentials insecurely by requiring the agent to include secret values verbatim in its generated output. This exposes credentials in the agent’s context and conversation history, creating a risk of data exfiltration.

Why it was flagged

The skill explicitly instructs agents to pass and report "session tokens", "credentials", and "every hop, credential" between sub-agents, which requires including secret values verbatim in outputs.

Low

Low-risk findings.

1 low severity finding. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.

Low

W011: Third-party content exposure detected (indirect prompt injection risk).

What this means

The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.

Why it was flagged

SKILL.md:85-88 and SKILL.md:92-102 describe reading recon/SUMMARY.md and “recent findings/FIND-*.md” and then passing exact recon-derived content (e.g., vectors/URLs/params/tokens/sessions) into subsequent `task("exploit", ...)` delegations, which at runtime would include outsider-authored free text if the recon stage extracts from public web pages or other non-user-authored sources.

Repository
PurpleAILAB/Decepticon
Audited
Security analysis
Snyk

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