Poisoned Pipeline Execution (PPE) — direct + indirect: inject commands via attacker-controllable build files (Makefile, package.json scripts, build.gradle, Dangerfile, .pre-commit-config.yaml), abuse pull_request_target / fork-PR triggers, and ride dependency / test-script execution on CI.
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tessl review fix ./packages/decepticon/decepticon/skills/standard/exploit/cicd/poisoned-pipeline-execution/SKILL.mdSecurity
2 findings: 1 critical severity, 1 medium severity. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.
Detected high-risk code patterns in the skill content — including its prompts, tool definitions, and resources — such as data exfiltration, backdoors, remote code execution, credential theft, system compromise, supply chain attacks, and obfuscation techniques.
This document explicitly details techniques to inject attacker-controlled code into CI/CD pipelines (direct and indirect PPE), with concrete examples of secret/data exfiltration, remote command execution, and supply-chain/backdoor abuse.
The skill prompts the agent to compromise the security or integrity of the user’s machine by modifying system-level services or configurations, such as obtaining elevated privileges, altering startup scripts, or changing system-wide settings.
This skill explicitly instructs modifying CI/workflow and repository build files to run attacker-controlled commands (postinstall hooks, workflow steps, Makefile/gradle/pom changes) that execute on CI runners and even mentions persistence via cron/systemd, which directly enables compromising the machine state and exfiltrating secrets.
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