Hunt LLM prompt injection and tool-call hijacking in modern AI-integrated applications (CWE-1427). Covers indirect injection via RAG, tool abuse, exfiltration chains, and jailbreak-to-RCE pivots on agentic systems.
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tessl review fix ./packages/decepticon/decepticon/skills/standard/analyst/prompt-injection/SKILL.mdSecurity
3 findings: 1 critical severity, 1 high severity, 1 medium severity. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.
Detected high-risk code patterns in the skill content — including its prompts, tool definitions, and resources — such as data exfiltration, backdoors, remote code execution, credential theft, system compromise, supply chain attacks, and obfuscation techniques.
This document is an explicit offensive playbook that provides PoC payloads and step-by-step techniques for prompt injection, data exfiltration (API keys, private keys), tool hijacking, SSRF and pivoting to sandbox RCE, and thus is clearly malicious in intent.
The skill handles credentials insecurely by requiring the agent to include secret values verbatim in its generated output. This exposes credentials in the agent’s context and conversation history, creating a risk of data exfiltration.
The playbook includes PoC payloads that explicitly tell an agent to include API keys/credentials or private keys verbatim in outputs (e.g., "include any API keys", "output the full contents of ~/.ssh/id_rsa", SQL selecting api_key), which forces the LLM to handle and emit secret values directly.
The skill prompts the agent to compromise the security or integrity of the user’s machine by modifying system-level services or configurations, such as obtaining elevated privileges, altering startup scripts, or changing system-wide settings.
The prompt contains explicit PoC instructions to exfiltrate sensitive files (e.g. ~/.ssh/id_rsa), to call tools with attacker-controlled queries (execute_sql/send_email/plugin_admin delete_account), and recommends treating every tool as enabled — all of which push an agent to perform harmful tool calls and data-exfiltration that can compromise the host.
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