.NET malware analysis — dnSpy/ILSpy decompilation, de-obfuscation (ConfuserEx, .NET Reactor, Babel, Crypto Obfuscator), behavioral analysis of managed assemblies, PowerShell cradle extraction, and config decryption for common .NET RAT families.
80%
Does it follow best practices?
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High
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tessl review fix ./packages/decepticon/decepticon/skills/standard/reverser/dotnet-malware/SKILL.mdThe skill handles credentials insecurely by requiring the agent to include secret values verbatim in its generated output. This exposes credentials in the agent’s context and conversation history, creating a risk of data exfiltration.
The guide instructs inserting extracted secrets (e.g., "<BASE64_PAYLOAD>", "<EXTRACTED_KEY>", "<EXTRACTED_SALT>", "<ENC_HOST>") directly into scripts and printing/decoding them, which requires the LLM/agent to handle and output secret values verbatim, creating an exfiltration risk.
The skill exposes the agent to untrusted, user-generated content from public third-party sources, creating a risk of indirect prompt injection. This includes browsing arbitrary URLs, reading social media posts or forum comments, and analyzing content from unknown websites.
High chance: the runtime workflow ingests the analyzed malware binary’s extracted strings/decompiled source/resources (outsider-authored sample text may include attacker-controlled “prompt injection” strings), and that prose is then printed/processed into outputs that would be added to the agent’s LLM context (e.g., via grep/strings dumps, Base64-decoded PowerShell, and resource/config plaintext).
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