rmm-tool-abuse
Legitimate RMM tool abuse — deploy or hijack Atera, ScreenConnect, AnyDesk, TeamViewer for persistence, lateral movement, and C2. Leverages trusted software to evade EDR and blend with IT admin traffic.
58
67%
Does it follow best practices?
Run evals on this skill
Adds up to 20 points to the overall score
View guide
Critical
Do not install without reviewing
Fix and improve this skill with Tessl
tessl review fix ./packages/decepticon/decepticon/skills/standard/exploit/rmm-tool-abuse/SKILL.mdSecurity
4 findings: 2 critical severity, 1 high severity, 1 medium severity. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.
E005: Suspicious download URL detected in skill instructions.
What this means
Detected a suspicious URL in the skill instructions that could lead the agent to download and execute malicious scripts or binaries. This includes links to executables from untrusted sources, typosquatting of official packages, URL shorteners that obscure the destination, and personal file hosting services.
Why it was flagged
These are vendor RMM endpoints and direct installer links (AnyDesk executables and an Atera API path) which, while legitimate, are explicitly used in the provided skill to deploy remote-access agents for persistence and C2, making them high-risk abuse vectors.
E006: Malicious code pattern detected in skill scripts.
What this means
Detected high-risk code patterns in the skill content — including its prompts, tool definitions, and resources — such as data exfiltration, backdoors, remote code execution, credential theft, system compromise, supply chain attacks, and obfuscation techniques.
Why it was flagged
This document is a high-risk, clearly malicious playbook giving step‑by‑step instructions to deploy and abuse RMM software for persistence, credential theft, lateral movement, remote code execution, and covert C2.
W007: Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.
What this means
The skill handles credentials insecurely by requiring the agent to include secret values verbatim in its generated output. This exposes credentials in the agent’s context and conversation history, creating a risk of data exfiltration.
Why it was flagged
The skill instructs extracting credentials from configs/registry and embedding secrets verbatim into commands/headers (echoing passwords into installers, curl -H "X-Api-Key: ...", Cookie: <ADMIN_SESSION>, etc.), which requires the LLM to handle and output secret values directly.
W013: Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions.
What this means
The skill prompts the agent to compromise the security or integrity of the user’s machine by modifying system-level services or configurations, such as obtaining elevated privileges, altering startup scripts, or changing system-wide settings.
Why it was flagged
This skill explicitly instructs installing and configuring remote-management agents, modifying system services and registry entries, and altering system configuration files to achieve persistence and remote control, which directly compromises the host state.
Low
Low-risk findings.
1 low severity finding. Worth noting, but not necessarily harmful.
W012: Unverifiable external dependency detected (runtime URL that controls agent).
What this means
The skill fetches instructions or code from an external URL at runtime, and the fetched content directly controls the agent’s prompts or executes code. This dynamic dependency allows the external source to modify the agent’s behavior without any changes to the skill itself.
Why it was flagged
The skill contains curl/msiexec and API calls that fetch and execute remote installers or scripts at runtime (for example: https://download.anydesk.com/AnyDesk.exe, https://download.anydesk.com/linux/anydesk_amd64.deb, https://<SCREENCONNECT_SERVER>/Bin/ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi, https://<SC_SERVER>/Services/PageService.ashx/RunCommand, https://app.atera.com/api/v3/agents/<AGENT_ID>/runscript, and http://<C2>/payload.ps1), so these are runtime external dependencies that directly execute remote code.
- Repository
- PurpleAILAB/Decepticon
- Commit
0cf691e
- Audited
- Security analysis
Is this your skill?
If you maintain this skill, you can claim it as your own. Once claimed, you can manage eval scenarios, bundle related skills, attach documentation or rules, and ensure cross-agent compatibility.