self-hosted-runner-abuse
Self-hosted runner abuse — non-ephemeral runner persistence, fork-PR job execution on self-hosted, runner-label targeting, secret/token theft from runner env, lateral movement from runner into internal network and cloud metadata services.
65
78%
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Critical
Do not install without reviewing
Fix and improve this skill with Tessl
tessl review fix ./packages/decepticon/decepticon/skills/standard/exploit/cicd/self-hosted-runner-abuse/SKILL.mdSecurity
3 findings: 1 critical severity, 1 high severity, 1 medium severity. Installing this skill is not recommended: please review these findings carefully if you do intend to do so.
E006: Malicious code pattern detected in skill scripts.
What this means
Detected high-risk code patterns in the skill content — including its prompts, tool definitions, and resources — such as data exfiltration, backdoors, remote code execution, credential theft, system compromise, supply chain attacks, and obfuscation techniques.
Why it was flagged
The document is an explicit attacker-oriented playbook describing deliberate malicious techniques (recon, persistence, credential exfiltration, lateral movement, and remote beaconing) for abusing self-hosted GitHub runners.
W007: Insecure credential handling detected in skill instructions.
What this means
The skill handles credentials insecurely by requiring the agent to include secret values verbatim in its generated output. This exposes credentials in the agent’s context and conversation history, creating a risk of data exfiltration.
Why it was flagged
The skill includes commands that read and display runner/cloud secrets (env grep for tokens, IMDS token assignment and reuse in headers, cat'ing serviceaccount tokens) and even instructs printing token prefixes, so an LLM following it may be required to handle or output secret values verbatim.
W013: Attempt to modify system services in skill instructions.
What this means
The skill prompts the agent to compromise the security or integrity of the user’s machine by modifying system-level services or configurations, such as obtaining elevated privileges, altering startup scripts, or changing system-wide settings.
Why it was flagged
The skill explicitly instructs creating persistent files, modifying the runner user's ~/.bashrc, installing a systemd user unit and enabling it, and querying cloud metadata — all actions that modify host state and enable persistence/exfiltration.
- Repository
- PurpleAILAB/Decepticon
- Commit
0cf691e
- Audited
- Security analysis
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