7-Question Gate

Run this gate after validate_finding returns success but BEFORE adding the finding to the report. Any "no" → kill the finding, don't write a report. This saves bounty validity-ratio and engagement- report quality.

The 7 questions

1. Is the asset in scope?

Check the engagement's scope.md (recon/decepticon's RoE doc):

• In-scope domain list
• In-scope IP/CIDR list
• Out-of-scope explicit exclusions (test envs, staging, third-party CDNs/CDN-managed subdomains where the org doesn't own the underlying machine)

If asset is not on the in-scope list OR on the out-of-scope list: kill. Do not write the report.

2. Is there real-world impact?

Theoretical bugs without demonstrable impact get N/A on every BB program. Concrete impact statements include:

• "An attacker can read victim user X's PII (email, name, DOB, SSN)"
• "An attacker can post on behalf of victim user X"
• "An attacker can transfer funds from victim user X's account"
• "An attacker can persist code on the production server"
• "An attacker can pivot to internal network 10.0.0.0/8"

If the finding's impact is "configuration is non-default" or "the manual recommends X but the deployment does Y" without concrete attacker-reachable harm: kill.

3. Does the PoC actually prove the impact?

The validate_finding result is necessary but not sufficient. The PoC must demonstrate the IMPACT, not just trigger the vector.

Examples:

• IDOR PoC must show ATTACKER session reading VICTIM data — not just "request returned 200 OK"
• XSS PoC must execute attacker-controlled JS in victim's browser context — not just "alert(1) reflected in HTML source"
• SQLi PoC must extract real data — not just "single quote → 500"
• SSRF PoC must reach an internal-only target — not just "external fetch worked"

If the PoC stops short of impact demonstration: kill or queue for re-verification with a better PoC.

4. Is the impact above the program's severity floor?

Many BB programs explicitly out-of-scope:

• CSRF on logout endpoint
• Self-XSS (requires victim to inject own payload)
• Missing security headers
• Information disclosure of public-by-design info
• Rate-limit issues w/o demonstrated abuse
• Subdomain takeover candidates where ownership can't be proven
• Clickjacking without authenticated state change

Read the program's "out of scope" / "won't fix" / "informational only" list. If the finding falls in those: kill or escalate to a chain that crosses the floor.

5. Can the operator reproduce it from your PoC alone?

A triager will not have your engagement context. The PoC must work standalone:

• All required prerequisites stated explicitly (account registration, specific user role, specific test data)
• Exact URL / parameter / cookie values
• Browser version if it matters
• Date/time stamp if the bug is recent and the program may patch in between

If the PoC requires "you also need state X that I had set up": kill or rewrite the PoC to include the setup.

6. Is it a known duplicate?

Check before submitting:

• Run gh search / Hacktivity search for the same vuln class on the same domain
• Read CHANGELOG / recent disclosures
• Check confirmed-findings.md and rejected-hypotheses.md notepad files in the current engagement

If the report likely duplicates a known disclosure: kill unless your variant has materially different impact or affects a different component.

7. Does the title sell the impact in one line?

Bad titles:

• "SSRF on /webhook"
• "JWT issue"
• "Mass assignment"

Good titles:

• "SSRF on /webhook → AWS instance-metadata cred extract → full account takeover"
• "JWT alg=none bypass → admin impersonation of any user"
• "Mass assignment on PATCH /api/users/me → self-promote to is_admin=true"

If you can't write a one-line title that names {vuln class, target, impact, severity}: kill and re-think whether the impact is real.

Decision

If all 7 are "yes" → proceed to report. Confidence: high.

If any are "no" → kill the finding. Mark it in notepad/rejected-hypotheses.md with the question number that failed and a one-line reason. Do NOT submit.

Why this gate matters

Bug-bounty programs track validity ratio (valid reports ÷ total submissions). Low validity → lower triage priority + lower long-term reward tier. The 7-Question Gate is the difference between a researcher with 90% validity (high earner) and one with 30% validity (eventually banned).

For internal engagements, this gate is the difference between a report consumed by stakeholders and a report that sits in a Jira backlog forever.

Integration

Verifier agent loads this skill BEFORE calling update_objective on a validated finding. Specifically:

1. validate_finding(...) returns success
2. load_skill("/skills/verifier/seven-question-gate/SKILL.md")
3. Walk through Q1-Q7 — write each answer to the finding's KG node:
     kg_add_node(kind="vulnerability", key=<finding>,
                 props={"gate_q1_scope": "yes",
                        "gate_q2_impact": "yes",
                        "gate_q3_poc_proves_impact": "yes",
                        ...})
4. If all Q1-Q7 = yes → update_objective(status="passed")
5. If any = no → update_objective(status="blocked",
                  reason="seven_question_gate: <Q#> failed: <reason>")

This makes the gate auditable — every finding has a written record of which question pass/failed before it reaches the report stage.

Anti-patterns

Cross-references

• Verifier agent prompt: decepticon/agents/prompts/verifier.md
• Verifier router: skills/verifier/SKILL.md
• Bounty report skill: skills/verifier/bounty-report/SKILL.md
• Operator's external triage-validation skill (Decepticon-external) for the broader gate methodology